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I. INTRODUCTION
The two most significant and well-known types of cases to
which the federal judicial power extends under article III are
cases arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States and cases between citizens of different states. 1
The federal bankruptcy jurisdiction statutes provide for fed-
eral district court jurisdiction over all civil proceedings"related to cases under title 11. ''2 The definition of a "related
to" case apparently would include a state-created cause of
action brought by the bankruptcy debtor against a non-diverse
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1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 2 extends the judicial power
to cases arising under (1) the Constitution, (2) laws of the United States, and
(3) treaties made or which shall be made; (4) cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls; (5) cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; and to
controversies (6) to which the United States is a party; (7) between two or more states;
(8) between a state and citizens of another state; (9) between citizens of different
states; (10) between citizens of the same state claiming land under grants of different
states; and (11) between a state or its citizens and foreign states.
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), which provides in full:
Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction
on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall
have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising
under title 11, or arising in or related to a case under title 11.
For analysis, this article focuses on a "related to" case in which the bankruptcy debtor
or his estate is the plaintiff. See infra notes 279-280 and accompanying text.
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defendant. May a federal court take jurisdiction of such a case
under the "related to" jurisdiction provision, or does article III
deny the federal court the power to decide such a case? Put
differently, as there is no diversity of citizenship between the
parties in such a case, does it arise under the laws of the
United States? An analysis of the "related to" jurisdiction
shows that it is, in fact, a species of article III "arising under"
jurisdiction that is referred to as protective jurisdiction.
Protective jurisdiction is present when in order to vindi-
cate or protect federal interests or policies Congress decides to
provide a federal forum but not a federal rule of decision for
certain classes of cases.3 In bankruptcy proceedings, there is a
clear federal interest in providing a forum for all claims
against the bankrupt debtor and all the debtor's claims,
3. For discussions of other theories of protective jurisdiction as well as objections
to the concept, see generally International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America Local Union No. 25, AFL v. W.C. Mead Inc.,
230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir. 1956); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART
& WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 415-18, 866-70 (2d ed.
1973) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.)]; H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 371-72, 744-48 (1953) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER]; Mishkin, The Federal Question in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV.
157, 184-96 (1953) [hereinafter Mishkin]; Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the
Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 224-25 (1948)
[hereinafter Wechsler].
One commentator has defined protective jurisdiction as follows:
Jurisdiction over actions of this kind-that is, jurisdiction over cases (1) in
federal court (2) between nondiverse parties (3) governed by nonfederal rules
of decision....
Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 933, 936 (1982) [herein-
after Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction]. Another commentator, Professor
Goldberg-Ambrose, has defined protective jurisdiction as follows:
There is no single working definition of protective jurisdiction in the legal
literature. Indeed, judges and commentators have been unable to agree on
what constitutes an exercise of protective jurisdiction in concrete cases. The
concept of protective jurisdiction tends to arise in situations in which Con-
gress has authorized a federal forum, the accepted minimum requirements for
a case to arise under federal law are not met, and no other basis for federal
jurisdiction can be found under article III of the Constitution. Since Con-
gress has necessarily concluded in such instances that a federal forum is
desired in order to promote some federal interest, the federal jurisdiction is
characterized as "protective" of that interest.
Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 542, 546-47 (1983) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Goldberg-Ambrose]. See also C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3565 (2d ed.
1984); Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln
Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957); Forrester, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in
Labor Disputes, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 114 (1948); Note, Federal Jurisdiction-
Protective Jurisdiction and Adoption as Alternative Techniques for Conkferring Juris-
diction on Federal Courts in Consumer Class Actions, 69 MICH. L. REV. 710 (1971).
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whether those claims are based on state law or federal law and
whether or not the parties are diverse. This article contends
that the most logically defensible explanation of protective
jurisdiction relies upon articles I and III and upon the same
political process that checks federal intrusion into state sover-
eignty in other areas. As long as Congress acts pursuant to a
valid article I power and its means-a protective jurisdiction
statute-are rationally related to its ends, then any case falling
under the jurisdictional statute "arises under" federal law pur-
suant to article III. The controls on congressional usurpation
of state power are article I, the case or controversy require-
ment of article III, and the political process.
This discussion has been raised in the wake of Northern
Pipeline Construction Company v. Marathon Pipe Line Com-
pany,4 in which the United States Supreme Court held' that a
non-article III6 "federal" judge could not decide purely state
law claims where only appellate review of those decisions was
available. In Marathon, plaintiff Northern Pipeline had filed a
4. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
5. It is difficult to say precisely what the Court's "holding" in Marathon was. In
the four judge (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) plurality opinion, Justice
Brennan painted with a broad brush, attempting to generally categorize those
instances where Congress may constitutionally employ legislative courts to resolve
disputes. In his concurrence, then Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justice O'Connor)
agreed that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 as written was unconstitutional, but refused to
consider the broader questions Justice Brennan addressed.
Chief Justice Burger dissented, as did Justice White (joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Powell). They believed that Congress' delegation of jurisdiction to
the bankruptcy courts in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was constitutional.
In the wake of Marathon, litigants contended that the Court's decision not only
struck down former 11 U.S.C. § 1471(c), which essentially had given the bankruptcy
courts jurisdiction over all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or
related to cases under title 11, but also that the Court's decision struck down the
Code's entire jurisdictional scheme, including the district court's bankruptcy
jurisdiction. The courts that considered this issue resolved it in favor of continued
district court jurisdiction, reasoning that Marathon only struck down § 1471(c). See,
e.g., In re Casey Corp., 46 Bankr. 473 (S.D. Ind. 1985); In re Pine Associates, Inc., 733
F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1984). Cf. infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 provides in part:
The Judges, both of the Supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.
For a discussion of the differences between "constitutional" courts and "legislative"
courts, see generally Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). In cases involving
non-article III judges, the issue usually arises in the form of a claim by one of the par-
ties that the case involves an exercise of the "judicial power" of the United States, and
as such that an article III judge is constitutionally required. See, e.g., Palmore v.
United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
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petition for reorganization under the federal bankruptcy laws.'
Subsequently Northern filed an adversary proceeding against
Marathon in the bankruptcy court, alleging state law causes of
action for breach of contract, breach of warranty, misrepresen-
tation, coercion, and duress. This proceeding was included in
the bankruptcy court's statutory jurisdiction over claims"related to" bankruptcy.'
The defendant objected to the bankruptcy court's jurisdic-
tion over the case. The defendant claimed that article III enti-
tled it to a hearing before a federal judge with life tenure
during good behavior and protection against salary diminu-
tions.' The bankruptcy judge was not such an "article III"
judge, therefore the bankruptcy judge could not constitution-
ally decide the case. The appellate review provided by the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 was insufficient to constitutionalize
the statutory procedure.' 0
In holding that the bankruptcy court could not adjudicate
the state law claims, the Court was not called upon to decide
whether the federal district court itself could have constitu-
tionally taken original jurisdiction of Northern's claim1
because it was "related to" bankruptcy. The parties were
diverse, so there was an independent basis for federal jurisdic-
tion.12 Thus, the Court did not decide whether an article III
court would have constitutional competence to hear a case
between a trustee, or debtor in possession, and a non-diverse
third-party involving state law claims like those in Marathon.
In the wake of Marathon,'13 Congress passed the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, which
once again gave the district court jurisdiction over all civil pro-
ceedings "related to cases under title 11.'14 The Act did
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 303.
8. 458 U.S. at 54.
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
10. Pub. L. No. 95-598.
11. But see Marathon, 458 U.S. at 73 n.26 ("This claim may be adjudicated in
federal court on the basis of its relationship to the petition for reorganization.").
12. In re Northern Pipeline Const. Co., 6 Bankr. 928 (Bankr. Minn. 1980). In fact,
Northern had filed a diversity action in Kentucky against Marathon before it filed its
reorganization petition. Id. at 929.
13. Actually, it took Congress two years to pass the 1984 Act. See, e.g., 130 CONG.
REC. S8891 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (comments of Sen. Hatch), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 590. In the interim, the federal bankruptcy systems
operated under an emergency rule. See, e.g., White Motor Corp. v. Citibank M.A., 704
F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1983). See infra text accompanying notes 29-32.
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (Supp. III 1985), which provides in full:
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attempt to rectify the Marathon problem; however, it did not
resolve the question of the federal courts' constitutional
competence.
The "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, when considered
in connection with the discretionary and mandatory abstention
provisions of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act,15 appears to be a constitutional effort to protect
the federal interest in efficient bankruptcy administration, and
at the same time preserve the states' interests in interpreting,
applying, and developing state law. This balance between state
and federal interests reflects the viability of the political pro-
cess as a meaningful control on congressional power.
Section II of this paper briefly sets out the jurisdictional
scheme of the 1984 Act. Section III presents and describes the
argument that the "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction is
unconstitutional. Statements in the legislative history indicate
that some legislators believed it would be unconstitutional for
a federal court to take jurisdiction in a non-diversity case with
Marathon-type state law issues.16 Several cases have adopted
this reasoning and have held that in order for a federal court
to have "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction there must be an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction.1 7
The Supreme Court cases supporting "related to" jurisdic-
tion are set out in section IV. Section V examines the "original
ingredient" theory of Osborn v. Bank of the United States'"
and discusses pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as bases for
the "related to" jurisdiction. Although courts that uphold"related to" jurisdiction reach the correct result, justifying the
federal court's "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction on grounds
of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction strains those concepts as we
know them.'9
Section VI discusses various theories of protective jurisdic-
tion, articulates the most persuasive of those theories, and
explains how the political process is the most acceptable check
Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction
on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall
have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising
under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) & (2).
16. See infra text accompanying note 54.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 55-57.
18. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 126-150.
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on federal power when protective jurisdiction is involved. Sec-
tion VII reexamines the "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction in
the context of the political process check on protective jurisdic-
tion, concluding that the compromise Congress reached
between federal and state interests in the 1984 Act shows that
the political process can function as a meaningful check on fed-
eral intrusion into state judicial sovereignty. Section VIII con-
tains some brief conclusory remarks.
II. THE "RELATED To" BANKRUPTCY
JURISDICTIONAL SCHEME
In 1978, Congress greatly expanded the jurisdiction of both
the district courts and the bankruptcy "courts." Congress
hoped to limit what it believed was unnecessary litigation over
jurisdiction and also to streamline and reduce the costs of the
bankruptcy process.2" Congress granted the bankruptcy court
jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising under title 11
[the Bankruptcy title] or arising in or related to cases under
20. See, e.g., S. BERNSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE AFrER THE AMENDMENTS ACT
OF 1984 21-23 (1984) [hereinafter BERNSTEIN]. Therein the author states:
One of the major achievements in the Reform Act of 1978 was the
abolition of the summary/plenary distinctions and the limitations on property
of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court and the court of bankruptcy
were merged in a single bankruptcy court; the restructured court was granted
an expanded, unitary, and pervasive jurisdiction. Practitioners were supposed
to put away their tin soldiers and battlefields-to bury the overly refined
distinctions between "merely colorable" and "materially adverse" claims, and
to close the traps for jurisdiction by ambush. All claims and causes of action,
whether existing as of the petition date or created by Congress, were to be
tried in the bankruptcy court, and any appropriate judgment, whether in rem,
quasi-in rem, or in personam, was to be entered by the bankruptcy court.
See also Comment, Jurisdiction Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984: Sum-
ming Up the Factors, 22 TULSA L.J. 167, 172 n.36 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, Sum-
ming up the Factors]. Mechanically, the 1978 Act initially vested this jurisdiction in the
district court, former 28 U.S.C. § 1471(a), but it subsequently decreed that the bank-
ruptcy court should exercise all the jurisdiction the statute gave the district court.
Former 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c). See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 54 n.3 ("Thus the ultimate
repository of the Act's broad jurisdictional grant is the bankruptcy courts."). As
another commentator has noted: "The ultimate repository of the entire grant of bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction to the district court was the bankruptcy court. In effect, the juris-
diction passed through the district courts without leaving any visible tracks."
Comment, Summing Up the Factors, at 175. See also Bankruptcy Court Revision:
Hearings on H. R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-27 (1977) (statement of J. Stan-
ley Shaw), cited in Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 975
n.202 and Note, Article III Limits on Article I Courts: The Constitutionality of the
Bankruptcy Court and the 1979 Magistrate Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 560, 564 n.28 (1980).
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title 11.1121 As the legislative history shows, this jurisdiction
might include almost any type of lawsuit such as contract, tort,
labor, and antitrust, as well as more common bankruptcy
disputes.22
As part of its decision that Congress had unconstitution-
ally delegated federal judicial power to non-article III judges in
the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, the Marathon Court held the entire
jurisdictional statute unconstitutional. In a footnote to his plu-
rality opinion, Justice Brennan refused to hold that the Act
was severable. 23 He did not believe that Congress, in light of
the Court's decision, would have preferred to route claims like
those at issue in Marathon through the district court rather
than the bankruptcy court.24  Brennan did not believe that
Congress lacked the constitutional power to confer such juris-
diction on federal courts, but rather that Congress should bear
the burden of restructuring the bankruptcy courts itself.25
In response to Marathon, the House proposed to make all
bankruptcy judges life-tenured article III judges.2 At the urg-
ing of the district judges, the Senate proposed greater district
court supervision over "related to" bankruptcy matters with-
out unduly swelling the ranks of the federal judiciary by mak-
ing all bankruptcy judges article III judges.2 While Congress
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c). See H.R. REP No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 445, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6400.
22. This is the broadest grant of jurisdiction to dispose of proceedings that
arise in bankruptcy cases or under the bankruptcy code. Actions that
formerly had to be tried in state court or in federal district court, at great cost
and delay to the estate, may now be tried in the bankruptcy courts .... The
bankruptcy court is given in personam jurisdiction as well as in rem
jurisdiction to handle everything that arises in a bankruptcy case.
H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 445, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6400. See generally Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction,
supra note 3, at 975 n.202.
23. 458 U.S. at 87 n.40.
24. He stated:
Nor can we assume, as THE CHIEF JUSTICE suggests ... that Congress' choice
would be to have this case "routed to the United States district court of which
the bankruptcy court is an adjunct." We think that it is for Congress to
determine the proper manner of restructuring the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 to




26. See generally R. DEMASCIO, W. NORTON, & LIEB, FOURTEEN YEARS OR LIFE:
THE BANKRUPTCY COURT DILEMMA (1983) [hereinafter DEMASCIO, NORTON, & LIEB],
and proposed statutes cited and discussed therein.
27. Id.
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bantered these proposals about, it allowed two stays of the
Supreme Court's Marathon decision to pass, and left itself in a
curious position: failure to enact new bankruptcy legislation
by December 24, 1982, would call all bankruptcy jurisdiction
into question.28
The logical response, curative legislation from Congress,
was not forthcoming. Instead, the Director of the Administra-
tive Office of United States Courts prepared and issued an
emergency rule,29 which all the district courts adopted with
minor local variations. Pursuant to the emergency rule, the
district court could refer its bankruptcy jurisdiction to the
bankruptcy court.30  However, the bankruptcy judge's power
over "related" proceedings was, absent party consent, limited
to preparing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
for district court review.31 The emergency rule defined a
related proceeding as one which absent bankruptcy could have
been brought only in the district court or state court, including
claims the estate brought against third parties who had not
filed claims in bankruptcy against the estate. 2
28. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 20; Comment, Summing Up the Factors, supra
note 20, at 177.
29. The congressional and constitutional authority for the preservation of any
bankruptcy jurisdiction at all lay in the position of the Judicial Conference of the
United States that Marathon only struck down the delegation of jurisdiction from the
district courts to the bankruptcy courts. See, e.g., Comment, Summing Up the Factors,
supra note 20, at 177. As the author states in a footnote:
Apparently, the position of the Judicial Conference was that only subsection
(c) of § 1471 was invalidated, leaving subsections (a) and (b) intact. In other
words, the Judicial Conference presumed that the jurisdictional grant to the
district courts was still in effect.
Id. at 177 n.81 (citation omitted). See DEMASCIO, NORTON, & LIEB, supra note 26, at 19.
See also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Comment, Summing up the Factors, supra note 20, at 177-79.
31. Id.
32. Model Emergency Bankruptcy Rule § (d)(3)(A), reprinted in WEST'S
BANKRUPTCY CODE, RULES AND FORMS xv (1983 ed.). See also Comment, Summing up
the Factors, supra note 20, at 177-78; BERNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 25-26. The definition
of related proceedings provided in full:
Related proceedings are those civil proceedings that, in the absence of a
petition in bankruptcy, could have been brought in a district court or a state
court. Related proceedings include, but are not limited to, claims brought by
the estate against parties who have not filed claims against the estate. Related
proceedings do not include: contested and uncontested matters concerning
the administration of the estate; allowance of and objection to claims against
the estate; counterclaims by the estate in whatever amount against persons
filing claims against the estate; orders in respect to obtaining credit; orders to
turn over property of the estate; proceedings to set aside preferences and
fraudulent conveyances; proceedings in respect to lifting of the automatic stay;
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Finally, on July 10, 1984, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,"3 a compro-
mise between the House and Senate proposals. Congress once
again vested the district court with "original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or
arising in or related to cases under title 11."14 None of these
three jurisdictional headings is defined. Most courts have con-
strued the term consistently with the definition in the emer-
gency rule.35
In another section of the Act, Congress provided that the
non-article III bankruptcy judges shall be known as the bank-
ruptcy court,36  and that the district court may refer all its
proceedings to determine the dischargeability of particular debts; proceedings
to object to the discharge; proceedings in respect to the confirmation of plans;
orders approving the sale of property where not arising from proceedings
resulting from claims brought by the estate against parties who have not filed
claims against the estate; and similar matters. A proceeding is not a related
proceeding merely because the outcome will be affected by state law.
Emergency Rule § (d)(3)(A).
33. For a compendium of the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, see Comment, Summing Up the Factors, supra
note 20, at 179-80 n.91.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added). The district courts also
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases under title 11. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(a). It is apparent that the term "case" in § 1334(a) is a term of art referring to
the bankruptcy case itself, which begins with the filing of the petition for relief under
title 11. See, e.g., King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy
Amendments Act of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REv. 675 (1985); Comment, Summing up the
Factors, supra note 20, at 180.
35. Comment, Summing up the Factors, supra note 20, at 181. The courts have
taken various views of what constitutes a "related to" claim. See, e.g., State ex rel
Roberts v. Mushroom King Inc., 77 Bankr. 813 (D. Or. 1987) (a case between two
creditors that has only a speculative, rather than a direct or substantial, impact on the
bankruptcy estate is not "related to" the bankruptcy); In re Consulting Actuarial
Partners, Ltd. Partnership, 72 Bankr. 821, 828 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (an adversary
proceeding is a "related to" case where the outcome will affect the bankruptcy estate,
but the right to relief does not depend upon application by construction of the
Bankruptcy Code); In re Turner, 724 F.2d 338, 340-41 (2d Cir. 1983) (court does not
have "related to" jurisdiction of cause of action remitted to debtor as exempt property
because the action could not have "significant connection" to the estate). See also In re
World Financial Services Center, Inc., 64 Bankr. 980, 987-88 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986); In
re Coral Petroleum, Inc., 62 Bankr. 699, 703-04 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); In re Yagow, 53
Bankr. 737, 739-40 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (in order to sustain "related to" jurisdiction
there must be an independent basis of federal jurisdiction); In re Bowling Green Truss,
Inc., 53 Bankr. 391 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (cataloging some of the various definitions
of "related to" but concluding that it means traditional state law claims triable only by
a state court judge or an article III judge); In re Climate Control Engineers, Inc., 51
Bankr. 359 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) (peripherally related claim is not "related to" a
case under title 11).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. III 1985). The bankruptcy court is a unit of the district
court, but the bankruptcy judges, whom the United States Courts of Appeals appoint,
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bankruptcy jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court7.3  These pro-
visions alone call forth the same constitutional questions at
issue in Marathon; thus Congress attempted to "constitutional-
ize" the new jurisdictional scheme by limiting the bankruptcy
court's power over certain matters and technically increasing
the district court's role, as the emergency rule had done.
The Act, in section 157(b)(1), allows the bankruptcy judge
to make final determinations in what the statute calls "core"
proceedings. Core proceedings are defined in section
157(b)(2), 3' and for the most part include traditional bank-
ruptcy matters such as the allowance of claims, decisions on
turnover orders, determinations of dischargeability, and confir-
mations of plans.39 The bankruptcy court's power over "related
serve only 14-year terms. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1). The bankruptcy judge's salary is
subject to fluctuation, because it is determined by the Federal Salary Act of 1967. 28
U.S.C. § 153(a). Thus the bankruptcy judge is not an article III federal judge with life
tenure during good behavior and protection from salary diminutions.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 157.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).
39. The statute provides:
(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to -
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or
exemptions from property of the estate, and estimations of claims or
interest for the purpose of confirming a plan under chapter 11 or 13
of title 11 but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or
unliquidated personal injury tort and wrongful death claims against
the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims
against the estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent
conveyances;
(I) determinations as to dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the
use of cash collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property
resulting from claims brought by the estate against persons who
have not filed claims against the estate; and
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of
the estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity
security holder relationship, except personal injury tort and
wrongful death claims.
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).
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to" cases is much more limited.
A "non-core" case, in which state rather than federal law
provides the rule of decision, is a "related to" bankruptcy
case.4" Thus a non-diversity Marathon-type case is a "related
to" bankruptcy proceeding. In such a case, the bankruptcy
judge may only enter proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law, which the district court must ostensibly review de
novo.4' All of these provisions address the Marathon problem
40. Conceivably, civil rights cases, antitrust cases, securities cases, and others
could be "related to" bankruptcy, but if federal law creates the cause of action there is
an independent basis for federal jurisdiction other than § 1334(b). See supra note 14.
There is some real confusion concerning what is and what is not a core proceeding. In
particular, three of the subheadings of § 157(b)(2) present peculiar problems because
of their potential breadth. Those are subheads (A), (E), and (0). Arguably, any
matter can potentially affect the administration of the estate and thus be a core
proceeding under § 157(b)(2)(A). Alternatively, if the concept of property is defined
broadly under § 157(b)(2)(E) then arguably any lawsuit, including a Marathon-type
claim, would involve the turnover of "property." Finally, the collection of a claim, like
that at stake in Marathon, could arguably affect the debtor-creditor relationship under
§ 157(b)(2)(O). Thus, read broadly, subheads (A), (E), and (0) make almost any claim
that is in any way related to bankruptcy a core proceeding. Several commentators
have considered this problem. See, e.g., Comment, Summing up the Factors, supra
note 20, at 185-88; King, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy
Amendments Act of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REV. 675, 686-95 (1985). Many courts have also
considered the problem. See, e.g., In re Allegheny, Inc., 68 Bankr. 183, 187-90 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1986) (account receivable action by debtor is a core proceeding under
§ 157(b)(2)(O)); In re Wood, 52 Bankr. 513 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985); In re Lion Capital
Group, 46 Bankr. 850 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). For a general discussion arguing for a
narrow interpretation of the § 157(b) definition of core proceeding, see 1 L. KING,
COLLIER ON BANKRUPrcy 3.01 [2][B][iii] (1985). See also In re Candelero Sand and
Gravel, Inc., 66 Bankr. 903 (D.P.R. 1986) (debtor lessee's claims against lessor and
third-party were non-core proceedings when claims arose from pre-bankruptcy
termination of lease and involved common law action only related to bankruptcy); In
re Sheafer and Miller Industries, 66 Bankr. 578 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986) (core
proceedings in 28 U.S.C. § 157 should not be construed broadly); In re The Aristera
Co., 65 Bankr. 928 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986) (holding that attempts to collect accounts
receivable are not core proceedings); In re Ross, 64 Bankr. 829 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(various entities allegedly controlled by the debtor sued several of the debtor's
creditors, who had filed an involuntary petition against the debtor, for intentional and
malicious interference with business relations; the court concluded that it was a core
proceeding, reading § § 157(b)(2)(A) and (0) broadly); In re Arnold Printworks, Inc.,
61 Bankr. 520 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (taking a more restricted view of core proceeding
and concluding that a claim by a debtor in possession against a buyer for accounts due
was a non-core matter); In re Sokol, 60 Bankr. 294 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that
debtor's action for contract or fraud was not a core proceeding).
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). See In re Mauldin, 52 Bankr. 838 (Bankr. N.D. Miss.
1985); In re Shaford Companies, 52 Bankr. 832 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1985); In re Climate
Control Engineers, Inc., 51 Bankr. 359 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); In re American
Energy, Inc., 50 Bankr. 175 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985). The parties may consent to the
bankruptcy court's hearing a non-core matter, in which case the district court would
review the decision under ordinary standards of appellate review. See In re
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of providing a hearing before an article III judge.4 2 However,
the key competency question, whether the federal court itself
has constitutional power over a non-diverse "related to" case,
remains unresolved.
The abstention provisions of the Act also bear reference.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1), the court may exercise its
discretion to abstain, in the interests of justice, comity, or
respect for state law.43 This discretion extends to both core
and non-core matters. Concomittantly, section 1334(c)(2) pro-
vides for mandatory abstention in a "related to" case based
upon a state law claim or cause of action only if there is no
independent basis of federal jurisdiction and if another pro-
Consolidated Lewis Investment Corp.-Ltd. Partnership, 78 Bankr. 469, 472 (Bankr.
M.D. La. 1987).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). Obviously, this entire scheme raises the same types of
questions involving judicial power at issue in Marathon. An analysis of the new
statutes' Marathon problem is beyond the scope of this article; however, for an
excellent discussion of the issue, see generally Comment, Summing up the Factors,
supra note 20. For a rather cynical, and perhaps realistic, view of the new
jurisdictional statute's treatment of "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, see King,
Jurisdiction and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984, 38 VAND.
L. REV. 675 (1985), wherein the author queries whether or not the district judge will
merely "rubber-stamp the proposed findings and conclusions of the bankruptcy judge
.... .Id. at 690-91 n.134. But the cases that read §§ 157(b)(1)(A),(E), and (0) narrowly
reach the arguably correct result. If a Marathon-type case is now "core," then the
bankruptcy judge can decide the case without de novo review. Given this reasoning,
the only real difference between the jurisdictional provisions struck down in Marathon
and those now set forth in the U.S. Code is the district court's power to withdraw the
reference, which does little once the bankruptcy court has already decided a matter.
But if Marathon cases that are not core proceedings are then subject to de novo
review, then the bankruptcy court cannot decide them finally, and there is a real
difference between the 1978 scheme struck down in Marathon and the new statute.
For this reason, it is submitted that Marathon-type state law claims are not core
proceedings.
It should be noted that courts have also reached conflicting results about the
categorization of claims unlike those involved in Marathon. Compare In re Bowling
Green Truss, Inc., 53 Bankr. 391 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (seniority dispute between
two creditors is a "related to" proceeding) with In re Douthit, 47 Bankr. 428, 431 (M.D.
Ga. 1985) (seniority dispute between two creditors is a "classic" core proceeding).
Compare In re Nanodata Computer Corp., 52 Bankr. 334 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985) (in
order for a counterclaim to be a "core" proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), a
counterclaim first must arise under or arise in a case under title 11) with Macon
Prestressed Concrete Co. v. Duke, 46 Bankr. 727 (M.D. Ga. 1985) (discussed in
Marathon, 458 U.S. at 79 n.31). See also infra note 55.
43. In full, the statute provides:
Nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of justice,
or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law, from
abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to a case under title 11.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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ceeding "is commenced and can be timely adjudicated" in state
court.4  Interestingly, the abstention provisions do not
expressly apply to personal injury or wrongful death actions,
which are likewise excluded from the definition of core pro-
ceedings.45 Read literally, absent discretionary abstention, per-
sonal injury and wrongful death cases that are in any way
related to a bankruptcy must be tried in the federal district
court.46  Thus a purely state-created tort action between a
44. The statute provides in full:
Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law
claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but not
arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11, with respect to which
an action could not have been commenced in a court of the United States
absent jurisdiction under this statute, the district court shall abstain from
hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely
adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction. Any decision to
abstain made under this subsection is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
The subsection shall not be construed to limit the applicability of the stay
provided for by section 362 of title 11, United States Code, as such section
applies to an action affecting the property of the estate in bankruptcy.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2). See generally In re Futura Industries, 69 Bankr. 831 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1987). One commentator has asked whether or not the words "is commenced"
mean "has been commenced prior to the commencement of the case" or "can be com-
menced after the commencement of the case." See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 20, at
30. The court may also abstain from hearing a "case" under title 11 pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 305, but the reference to "case" in that statute is apparently to the entire case,
which is commenced when the petition is filed.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). The statute excludes from the definition of core
proceedings liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort
and wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution under title 11.
28 U.S.C. § § 157(b)(4)-(5) provide:
(4) Non-core proceedings under section 157(b)(2)(B) of title 28, United
States Code, shall not be subject to the mandatory abstention provisions of
section 1334(c)(2).
(5) The district court shall order that personal injury tort and wrongful
death claims shall be tried in the district in which the bankruptcy case is
pending, or in the district court in the district in which the claim arose, as
determined by the district court in which the bankruptcy case is pending.
Query whether § 157(b)(4) means that the federal court may still exercise discre-
tionary abstention. The literal construction of § 157(b)(4) would indicate "yes"; the
implication of § 157(b)(5) would be "no."
46. One commentator has noted that § § 157(b)(4)-(5) may not mean precisely
what they say, but instead that trial of personal injury and wrongful death claims may
occur in the bankruptcy court as opposed to the district court. BERNSTEIN, supra note
20, at 64, says:
At least one of the conferees suggested that the trials of personal injury or
wrongful death claims were to proceed before the bankruptcy judges as
related proceedings. The conferee observed that the phrase "tried in the
district court" was a drafting error which should be immediately corrected so
that these proceedings would be deemed related proceedings to be tried before
the bankruptcy court. The judgment, and de novo review on objections by the
parties, would still be the responsibility of the district court acting upon the
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bankruptcy debtor and a non-diverse defendant could be heard
in federal court, just like a non-diversity Marathon-type case.
In both cases, the question remains whether federal courts
may constitutionally exercise subject matter jurisdiction.
III. THE No JURISDICTION ARGUMENT
As noted, the two most common headings of constitutional
federal court jurisdiction are jurisdiction over cases arising
under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States
and jurisdiction over disputes between citizens of different
states.47 These constitutional jurisdictional provisions are not
self-effectuating. Congress must legislatively create federal
courts and vest them with jurisdiction over any or all of the
matters defined in article III.48 But, as Dean Forrester noted:
"If Congress passes a statute presuming to authorize the fed-
eral courts to handle cases which are not within the terms of
article III the statute is unconstitutional."49
Pursuant to its article I, section 8, clause 9 power to "con-
stitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court,"5 ° Congress
has created lower federal courts and has vested them with
both broad and narrow areas of jurisdiction. Two of the
broadest statutory grants of jurisdiction effectuate the two
broadest article III jurisdictional headings: the federal ques-
tion jurisdiction statute, which unfortunately mirrors the "aris-
bankruptcy judge's report and recommendations. Few district judges will
want to hear any more personal injury cases.
The courts have agreed. In In re Poole Funeral Chapel, Inc., 79 Bankr. 37 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1987), the court recommended that the district court withdraw its reference
and abstain in a personal injury claim. The claimants had brought suit against a bank-
rupt funeral parlor for injuries incurred in an accident while riding in one of the
debtor's limousines. The court read the abstention statutes to mean that the
mandatory abstention statute did not apply to personal injury or wrongful death
claims but that the discretionary abstention statute did. Accord In re White Motor
Credit, 761 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1985).
47. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. As noted, there are nine other special categories of
jurisdiction, but they are inapposite to the discussion herein.
48. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). Contrawise, Justice
Story took the position that Congress had an absolute obligation to vest the full
constitutional jurisdiction in the federal courts. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). For a discussion and repudiation of Story's theory, see, e.g.,
HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 313-15; Warren, New Light on the History
of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923).
49. Forrester, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Labor Disputes, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 114, 121 (1948).
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
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ing under" language of article III, 51  and the diversity
jurisdiction statute.5 2 One of the "narrow" congressional
grants of jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)-jurisdiction over
all cases "related to" bankruptcy-which Congress enacted
pursuant, at least in part, to its power to make uniform rules
for bankruptcy.5 3
A number of courts and some of the proponents of the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeships Act of 1984
have contended that construing "related to" bankruptcy to
include a non-diversity Marathon-type state law case would
render the jurisdictional statute unconstitutional. They con-
tend that because there is no diversity of citizenship and fed-
eral law does not govern the decision of the case, a "related to"
case does not "arise under" federal law; therefore article III
prohibits the exercise of federal jurisdiction. In Congress, Sen-
ator Hatch was the most vocal proponent of this position.'
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. III 1985); Wechsler, supra note 3, at 224 ("It is
unfortunate that since the Act in 1875, the statute has adopted as a test of jurisdiction
in the lower courts the very language that the Constitution gives to measure the
authority of the Congress to vest such jurisdiction in a federal court: cases arising
under the Constitution, laws, and treaties.").
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Supp. III 1985).
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 provides that Congress shall have the power: "To
establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States ...."
54. As he stated following the Act's passage:
I have only one regret as I reflect upon this conference product. It
involves the deletion of the Senate-passed mandatory abstention provision.
With its deletion, purely State law claims which do not arise under the
Bankruptcy Code are allowed to be tried in federal courts. This presents an
important constitutional concern. State tort or contract cases in which one
party happens to be bankrupt are still State law claims. They are not Federal
questions. Thus, there is no Federal jurisdiction for these claims. The
Constitution only grants Federal court jurisdiction to cases "arising under"
Federal law and diversity cases. This is neither. The Senate abstention
provision would have remedied this problem....
130 CONG. REC. § S8891 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Hatch), reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 590, 591.
Senator Hatch's references are somewhat vague; however, it seems apparent that
he was concerned with the constitutionality, under article III, of the "related to" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction. Assuming that, there is a fundamental inconsistency in Senator
Hatch's statement, in addition to a constitutional error that is discussed below. Sena-
tor Hatch argues that "related to" jurisdiction is unconstitutional, and claims that the
cure is a mandatory abstention provision. However, abstention is a doctrine or mecha-
nism a court invokes when it has jurisdiction but for any number of compelling rea-
sons decides not to exercise that jurisdiction. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971);
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940) (even though the federal
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction of a case involving the trustee's title to property, it
was proper to abstain and direct the trustee to bring the proceeding in state court).
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In In re Yagow,"5 the court considered a case in which a
credit association brought an adversary proceeding against a
non-diverse debtor, alleging that its claim was non-dischargea-
ble. By way of defense and counterclaim the debtor claimed
that the credit association had breached a financing commit-
ment, to the debtor's consequent damage. Subsequently, the
credit association moved to dismiss the counterclaim, alleging
that the bankruptcy court had no subject matter jurisdiction
over it because there was no diversity and the counterclaim did
not arise under federal law. In accepting the credit associa-
tion's contention, the court held that such a case was not suffi-
ciently related to the bankruptcy proceeding to confer
jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court, absent an independent
basis of federal jurisdiction.56
Thus, the Yagow court would refuse to find jurisdiction in
a non-diversity Marathon-type case.57 But this view of the
Thus if Senator Hatch's basic premise is correct and "related to" jurisdiction is uncon-
stitutional, abstention is an illogical response. No jurisdiction is the only answer if
Senator Hatch's underlying premise is correct.
Despite the inconsistency between the allegedly unconstitutional subject matter
jurisdiction problem and the abstention remedy, Senator Hatch's underlying argu-
ments do have certain persuasive appeal. Clearly there is no diversity of citizenship in
the hypothetical case. Moreover, federal law is not involved at any point in the deci-
sion of the case. See, e.g., American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S.
257 (1916). See also Mishkin, supra note 3, at 186-87. Thus, such a case cannot "arise
under" federal law. Senator Hatch not only argued against the constitutionality of the
"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, but insisted upon having a written analysis of its
unconstitutionality attached to the legislative history. Other legislators echoed Hatch's
concerns. As Senator Heflin stated: "Not everyone is happy with all the provisions of
this report, and I too fear that there may be serious constitutional ramifications." 130
CONG. REC. § S8887 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Heflin), reprinted in
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 581, 584-85. See also Palcor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743
F.2d 984, 996 n.16 (3d Cir. 1984).
55. 53 Bankr. 737 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985).
56. Id. at 740.
57. It should be noted that the Yagow court, like Senator Hatch, confused
abstention and lack of jurisdiction. Its confusion is evident in the following quotation
from the opinion:
Accordingly, and for the reasons stated, this Court as a court of
bankruptcy, believing that the Production Credit Association's Motion for
Dismissal of Counterclaim is well-taken, elects to abstain in the interests of
justice and for lack of jurisdiction.
Id. at 740.
Other cases espousing the Yagow view of federal court jurisdiction include: State
Bank of Lombard v. Chart House, 46 Bankr. 468 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (the court abstained
because giving a broad definition to the phrase "related to" would be a jurisdictionally
infirm construction); In re Bobroff, 43 Bankr. 746 (E.D. Pa. 1984), affd 766 F.2d 797
(3rd Cir. 1985) (Bobroff was probably not a "related to" claim because it involved post-
petition claims in a liquidation proceeding, but the district court's view of jurisdiction
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"arising under" requirement confuses the constitutional and
statutory phrases and ignores precedents that suggest that
the federal court's "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction is
constitutional.
Although article III and the federal question jurisdiction
statute both use the same two words-"arising under"-and
neither the cases nor the commentators are entirely clear on
the matter, the constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction, as
Justice Rutledge noted in National Insurance Co. v. Tidewater
Transfer Co., 8 has a broader scope than the "arising under"
jurisdiction provided for in the federal question jurisdiction
statute.59 It is generally said that a case "arises under" the fed-
was extremely limited). See also Chamberlain Livestock Auction, Inc. v. Aberdeen
Production Credit Association, 22 Bankr. 750 (D.S.D. 1982). In most of these cases it is
difficult to say what the holding is per se, because the courts frequently abstain or rely
upon a narrow statutory construction of the phrase "related to." But from the courts'
dicta, it is clear that all of them adopt a narrow theory of jurisdiction.
58. 337 U.S. 582, 614-15 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
59. The seminal case dealing with the scope of the constitutional phrase "arising
under" is Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); see infra
text accompanying notes 112-125. In reference to Osborn and the scope of the article
III "arising under" jurisdiction, Professor Wechsler stated:
The power of the Congress to confer the federal judicial power must
extend, as Marshall held, to every case that might involve an issue under
federal law....
Needless to say, Congress has not meant to grant the district courts a
general jurisdiction in every case involving the jurisdictional amount in which
it could confer judicial power under any of its sources of authority.... There
is hardly any limit to the cases it would draw today. The courts have been
obliged, therefore, to draw a line between the power and the purpose of the
Congress, even though their verbal measure is the same. Though the
decisions are not free from vacillation, their essential purpose is to hold the
meaning of the statute limited to cases where the plaintiff's cause of action,
the rule of substance under which he claims the right to have a remedy, is the
product of the federal law. This seems quite plainly the correct solution and
one that would be happily adopted by the statute. The general clause should
not be cast in constitutional language. Its scope should be expressly limited to
cases where the plaintiff's claim for relief is founded on the Constitution,
laws, or treaties. This change would have the added virtue of dismissing the
recurrent thought that jurisdiction should not hold, though the asserted right
is federal, if the case does not involve construction of the law but only finding
of the facts to which the law must be applied. The federal courts do not sit to
give material for law review articles. Their business is the vindication of the
rights conferred by federal law.
Wechsler, supra note 3, at 224-25 (emphasis and footnotes omitted). Professor Mishkin
also expressly notes that the statutory "arising under" jurisdiction is narrower than
the constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction. Mishkin, supra note 3, at 184-96. But
see Chadbourn and Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L.
REV. 639, 642-45 (1942); Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question ", 16 TUL. L. REV.
362 (1942); Forrester, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Labor Disputes, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 114, 126 (1948) (arguing that the scope of statutory and constitutional
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eral question statute when federal law creates the plaintiff's
cause of action and that the applicability of federal law to
"arising under" jurisdiction are the same); Wollett & Wellington, Federalism and
Breach of the Labor Agreement, 7 STAN. L. REV. 445, 475 (1955); Note, Federal Jurisdic-
tion-Protective Jurisdiction and Adoption as Alternative Techniques for Conferring
Jurisdiction on Federal Courts in Consumer Class Actions, 69 MICH. L. REV. 710, 715
(1971).
Chadbourn and Levin and Forrester find some support for the proposition that the
two are coextensive in the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, wherein Senator Car-
penter, speaking of the bill as a whole rather than solely the federal question section,
stated the following:
The Act of 1789 did not confer the whole power which the Constitution
conferred; it did not do what the Supreme Court has said Congress ought to
do; it did not perform what the Supreme Court has declared to be the duty of
Congress. This bill does.... This bill gives precisely the power which the
Constitution confers-nothing more, nothing less.
Quoted in HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 871. But this statement relied
upon Story's view that Congress had the constitutional obligation to confer all of the
constitutional jurisdiction on the lower federal court-a view subsequently rejected.
See, e.g., Comment, Summing up the Factors, supra note 20, at 177-79. Likewise, as
noted above, Senator Carpenter's statement was a reference to the bill as a whole, not
solely to the federal question section. For further commentators questioning whether
or not the scope of the constitutional and statutory "arising under" jurisdiction is or
should be different, see generally Hornstein, Federalism, Judicial Power and the
"Arising Under" Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A Hierarchical Analysis, 56 IND.
L.J. 563 (1980); Note, The Outer Limits of "Arising Under", 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 978
(1979).
Obviously, for the commentators to be in disagreement there must be some case
law confusion on the matter, and there is. Osborn indicates the broad authority Con-
gress has to confer constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction on the federal courts. See
infra text accompanying notes 112-125. But the statute has been interpreted more nar-
rowly. See, e.g., Mishkin, supra note 3, at 160-63. Unfortunately, it is not clear from
some of the cases whether they are narrowly interpreting the statute or narrowly
interpreting the constitutional phrase and thus limiting, if not expressly overruling,
Osborn. An example of this confusion is Justice Cardozo's statement in Gully v. First
National Bank:
How and when a case arises "under the Constitution or laws of the
United States" has been much considered in the books ....
Looking backward we can see that the early cases were less exacting than
the recent ones in respect of some of these conditions [a reference to Osborn].
If a federal right was pleaded, the question was not always asked whether it
was likely to be disputed. This is seen particularly in suits by or against a cor-
poration deriving its charter from an act of Congress .... "A suit to enforce a
right which takes its origins in the laws of the United States is not necessarily,
or for that reason alone, one arising under those laws, for a suit does not so
arise unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy
respecting the validity, construction or effect of such a law, upon the determi-
nation of which the result depends."
299 U.S. 109, 112-14 (1936) (quoting Shultis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1911)).
More recent Supreme Court cases have recognized and articulated that the consti-
tutional "arising under" jurisdiction is broader than the statutory "arising under"
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354,
379-80 (1959).
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plaintiff's case must appear on the face of plaintiff's well-
pleaded complaint.6 ° But the scope of "arising under" in arti-
cle III is broader. For example, certain removal statutes allow
removal of cases from state court to federal court where fed-
eral law is involved as a defense and not as part of the plain-
tiff's complaint. 1 Moreover, since Justice Marshall's seminal
opinion in Osborn,62 it has been clear that the article III "aris-
ing under" jurisdiction is broader than the articulated test for
determining statutory federal question jurisdiction. Thus, the
fact that federal law does not create plaintiff's cause of action
is irrelevant to the constitutional competency question, and
any suggestion to the contrary confuses the constitutional and
statutory phrases.
But the no "related to" jurisdiction proponents may
counter that in those cases where federal original jurisdiction
exists and where the plaintiff's cause of action is based on state
law there is at least some question of federal law involved,
albeit perhaps as a defense. In a non-diversity "related to"
bankruptcy case there is no question of federal law; therefore,
there is no federal jurisdiction. In support of this proposition,
a no jurisdiction supporter predictably might point to what the
Supreme Court said in Shultis v. McDougal:6 3 "[A] suit does
not so arise [under the laws of the United States] unless it
really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy
respecting the validity, construction or effect of such a law,
upon the determination of which the result depends."6 4 If this
is the law, then a breach of contract case between a person in
bankruptcy and a non-diverse defendant does not in any way
arise under federal law. But the Shultis quote does not appear
to be the law related to original jurisdiction as opposed to
60. HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 879-90. See also Franchise Tax
Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
61. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (providing for removal of civil or criminal
prosecution from state court to federal court when an officer of the United States is
the defendant); see also Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879) (upholding a statute
providing for the removal of state actions against officers acting under United States
revenue laws); 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (providing for removal of certain civil rights cases).
62. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
63. 225 U.S. 561 (1912).
64. Id. at 569. Hart and Wechsler refer to this as a "much-quoted statement."
HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 885. Mishkin, in reference to this quote,
states: "Myriad instances of repetition, either verbatum or paraphrase, easily can be
found by reference to the annotations to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331." Mishkin, supra note 3, at
170 n.57. See also HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 884-85; Note, The Outer
Limits of "Arising Under", 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 978 (1979).
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Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. Professor Mishkin, in
discussing the "arising under" statute, lamented the unfortu-
nate language in the above-cited Shultis quote and its subse-
quent citation in original jurisdiction cases. 5 According to
Mishkin, the lower federal courts could have constitutional
competence over cases where there is no dispute over the con-
struction of federal law. Particularly, he noted that there may
well be cases where federal law was clear, but that in order to
vindicate a federal right, resolution of factual disputes in a fed-
eral forum would be critical. But does this competence extend
beyond a case where the construction of federal law is agreed
upon and only the facts are at issue to a case where the con-
struction of federal law, other than a jurisdictional statute, is
irrelevant? Osborn suggests that it might.
IV. SINCE AT LEAST 1875 THE SUPREME COURT HAS
RECOGNIZED CONGRESS' POWER TO GRANT THE
FEDERAL COURTS JURISDICTION OVER
CASES "RELATED To"
BANKRUPTCY
In a series of cases the United States Supreme Court has
recognized Congress' power to grant the federal courts broad
jurisdiction over cases related to bankruptcy. Unfortunately,
these decisions fail to posit a persuasive analytical justification
for the jurisdiction.
65. The "requirement" [of a real and substantial controversy over the
meaning of fedral law] itself, not to mention the language in which it is often
expressed, sterls from an uncritical transference to the lower federal courts of
a standard developed for the exercise of the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction. What has been ignored in the process is the complete difference
in the functions of the two types of jurisdiction: the Supreme Court is the
ultimate judicial exponent of federal rights; the lower federal courts are their
vindicators. Only cases involving actual disputes as to the import of national
law can provide grist for the former's mill of exposition, but enforcement may
be necessary even where the governing rule is clear. Thus, the rules limiting
the high Court's appellate jurisdiction to issues turning on the construction of
federal law, quite proper there, are not at all apposite for the inferior national
tribunals. Indeed, the term "federal question," precisely descriptive of the
former type of jurisdiction is, as to the latter, a misnomer. Accuracy, at least,
would be better served by some such term as federal claim. For the trial of an
issue of fact may be as important a factor in the vindication of a federal right
as the determination of the legal content of that right. Indeed, were it not for
the necessity of resolving issues of fact, the jurisdiction of the inferior national
courts over cases "arising under" the law of the United States might
conceivably be dispensable.
Mishkin, supra note 3, at 170-71 (footnote omitted).
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The Bankruptcy Act of 1867, as amended by the Act of
1874, gave the federal courts "jurisdiction, as an ordinary court,
of suits at law or in equity brought by or against the assignee
[of a bankrupt debtor] in reference to alleged property of the
bankrupt, or to claims alleged to be due from or to him."66
The 1867 jurisdictional statute essentially included any suit by
or against the trustee, including a non-diversity Marathon-type
case.
The Supreme Court interpreted the quoted jurisdictional
provisions in Lathrop v. Drake. The issue in Lathrop was
whether the statutory jurisdiction extended to all federal
courts or to only the one where the bankruptcy proceeding
itself was pending. In concluding that the jurisdiction was
nationwide Justice Bradley, speaking for the Court, expressly
recognized Congress' power to provide for jurisdiction in any
action by or against the assignee. He stated:
The state courts may undoubtedly be resorted to in
cases of ordinary suits for the possession of property or the
collection of debts; and it is not to be presumed that embar-
rassments would be encountered in those courts in the way
of a prompt and fair administration of justice. But a uniform
system of bankruptcy, national in its character, ought to be
capable of execution in the national tribunals, without
dependence upon those of the states in which it is possible
that embarrassments might arise.68
It is evident that Justice Bradley recognized Congress'
power to provide a federal forum for certain state law cases.
Arguably, he recognized congressional power to protect a
bankrupt estate and its creditors from discrimination, or as he
calls it "embarrassment," at the hands of the state courts.
Embarrassments might occur if the state courts preferred their
own citizens in cases against trustees.69 One might also read
66. Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U.S. 516, 517 (1875).
67. 91 U.S. 516 (1875).
68. Id. at 518. The Court then went on and approvingly cited Shearman v.
Bingham, 21 Fed. Cas. 1270 (C.C.D. Mass. 1872) (No. 12,762), which had expressly
recognized and held that Congress had the power to provide for subject matter
jurisdiction in all suits by and against the assignee. Shearman was a case written and
decided by Justice Clifford while riding circuit.
69. Some courts apparently do not believe that Lathrop decided that Congress had
power to confer the subject matter jurisdiction discussed therein. For instance in In
re Bobroff, the court stated:
In the first Bankruptcy Act enacted in 1867, 14 Stat. 517, Congress gave
broad authority to courts of the United States over "suits at law or in equity
1987]
22 University of Puget Sound Law Review
embarrassments to mean the possibility of delay that might
ensue if the trustee or assignee had to litigate certain claims in
the state courts. This delay might inhibit efficient administra-
tion of the federal bankruptcy case. Embarrassments might
also include state court decisions undermining or conflicting
with, albeit implicitly, some federal bankruptcy goal or princi-
ple. For example, if a state court awarded a judgment against
the bankrupt debtor on a state law claim, the successful plain-
tiff must then attempt to have his judgment satisfied from the
same funds that the bankruptcy court is dispersing among
creditors.
Unfortunately for present purposes, Bradley did not
expressly articulate the source of Congress' power to prevent
embarrassments. He took it for granted. Clearly it was and is
related to Congress' power to make uniform bankruptcy
laws,7° but Bradley did not clearly spell out that relationship.
His lack of clarity is symptomatic of later Supreme Court opin-
ions on this subject.
After Congress repealed the Act of 1867 in 1878, it next
approached the subject of bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898.7 In that Act, Congress significantly cut back on the
jurisdiction of the federal courts sitting in bankruptcy. Suits
could only be brought "in the same manner and to the same
extent as though bankruptcy proceedings had not been insti-
tuted and such controversies had been between the bankrupt
brought by or against the assignee in reference to alleged property of the
bankrupt, or to claims alleged to be due from or to him," and this jurisdiction
was exercised without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
43 Bankr. at 749 n.6 (quoting Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U.S. 516, 517 (1875)). Apparently,
the scope of the jurisdiction of article III courts under the 1867 Act to sweep up and
decide claims not subject to any federal rule of decision was never addressed.
The Bobroff court must read Lathrop as only holding that all federal courts, not
just the one where the bankruptcy was pending, could exercise the granted jurisdic-
tion, whether constitutionally or not. Hart and Wechsler do not read Lathrop so nar-
rowly. They characterize it as follows: "The jurisdiction [over claims brought by or
against the assignee], the Court held, could be exercised, without regard to the citizen-
ship of the parties...." HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 745-46; HART & WECHS-
LER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 888. Before quoting the language set forth in the text,
see supra text accompanying note 68, they state: "Without directly adverting to the
question of the validity of this protective jurisdiction, the Court said .... HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 746 (emphasis added); HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra
note 3, at 888 (emphasis added). Whatever the precise holding in Lathrop, it is indica-
tive of the Court's belief that the questioned jurisdiction existed.
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 provides that Congress shall have power: "To
establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States."
71. Act of June 7, 1878, 20 Stat. 99 (1878).
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and such adverse claimants. ' 72 Another section of the statute
provided that suits by or against the trustee had to be brought
in the court where they could have been instituted absent
bankruptcy "unless by consent of the proposed defend-
ant.... ,,3 Under these jurisdictional provisions alone a plain-
tiff debtor could not bring a non-diversity Marathon-type case
in federal court, absent the defendant's consent. This was
because, but for the bankruptcy, the parties could have liti-
gated only in state court and Congress had chosen not to real-
locate disputes among state and federal tribunals merely
because one party filed a bankruptcy.
In Schumacher v. Beeler,4 the Supreme Court construed
the "consent" clause in an action involving an allegedly
improper sheriff's sale of a bankruptcy debtor's property.75
The Court held that the "consent" clause referred to jurisdic-
tion, not merely to venue and stated:
But no reason appeared for a denial of jurisdiction to the
federal court if the defendant, the adverse claimant, con-
sented to be sued in that court. The Congress, by virtue of
its constitutional authority over bankruptcies, could confer
or withhold jurisdiction to entertain such suits and could
prescribe the conditions upon which the federal courts
should have jurisdiction. 76
Thus the Court again recognized Congress' power to grant
federal courts broad jurisdiction in bankruptcy-related pro-
ceedings. Once again, the analytical basis for its holding was
not clear.
Subsequently, the Court considered an amendment to the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that declared the provisions of the
bankruptcy act relating to suits brought by the trustee7 7 inap-
72. Act of May 27, 1926, 44 Stat. 664 (1926) (amending 11 U.S.C. § 346(a), originally
enacted as Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 23(a)).
73. Act of May 27, 1926, 44 Stat. 664 (1926) (amending 11 U.S.C. § 346(b), originally
enacted as Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 23(b)).
74. 293 U.S. 367 (1934).
75. In National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582
(1949), Justice Jackson's plurality opinion referred to Beeler as a case "raising only
questions of Ohio law concerning the validity under that law of a sheriff's levy and
execution." 337 U.S. at 595.
76. 293 U.S. at 374. In support of the second sentence quoted in the text the Court
cited Shearman v. Bingham, 21 Fed Cas. 1270 (C.C.D. Mass 1872) (No. 12, 762). See
supra note 68.
77. See supra text accompanying note 72.
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plicable to reorganizations." In Williams v. Austrian,79 the
trustee in a reorganization proceeding pending in the Eastern
District of Virginia sued past and present officers and directors
of the debtor in federal court in the Southern District of New
York, alleging a conspiracy to misappropriate corporate assets.
The trustee sought an accounting, among other things.8 0 State
law created these causes of action, and it would govern their
decision. Moreover, there were no allegations of diversity.8 '
(The suit would be a "related to" bankruptcy suit under the
1984 amendments.)
There was a bitter dissent on a matter of statutory con-
struction, 2 but both the majority and the dissent recognized
78. The Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 10, art. I, § 102, 52 Stat. 840, 883 (1938).
79. 331 U.S. 642 (1947). Cf. Lovell v. Newman, 227 U.S. 412 (1913). Therein the
Court took the position that the consent provision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was
not intended to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Thus if there was no
diversity and no other federal question, there was no § 23(b) jurisdiction. The case
involved the right to possess certain cotton, and the Court concluded, relying on
Shultis, that such a case did not arise under a law of the United States. In Tidewater,
Justice Rutledge stated the following about Lovell in his concurrence:
To be sure, although this Court indicated a contrary view in the early case
of Lovell v. Newman, Chief Justice Hughes' opinion in Schumacher v. Beeler
made it perfectly clear that district courts can, with the consent of the
proposed defendant, entertain trustee suits under § 23(b) which the bankrupt,
but for the Bankruptcy Act, could not have prosecuted in a federal court
absent diversity or some independent federal question "arising under ... the
Laws of the United States."
337 U.S. at 611 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
80. 331 U.S. at 645.
81. Id. at 645 ("There was no allegation of diversity and jurisdiction was rested
upon 'the Constitution of the United States (Article I, Section 8, Clause 4, and Article
III, Section 2), the Act of Congress relating to Bankruptcies (U.S. Code Title 11), and
... the provisions of Section 24(1), (19) of the Judicial Code ... ' ").
82. The point of statutory construction involved § § 2 and 23(b) of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898. Section 23 provided in full:
(a) The United States district court shall have jurisdiction of all
controversies at law and in equity, as distinguished from proceedings in
bankruptcy, between trustees as such and adverse claimants concerning the
property acquired or claimed by the trustee, in the same manner and to the
same extent only as though bankruptcy proceedings had not been instituted
and such controversies had been between the bankrupt and such adverse
claimants.
(b) Suits by the trustee shall be brought or prosecuted only in the courts
where the bankrupt, whose estate is being administered by such trustee,
might have brought or prosecuted them if proceedings in bankruptcy had not
been instituted, unless by consent of the proposed defendant, except suits for
the recovery of property under § 60, subdivision (b); § 67, subdivision (e); and
§ 70, subdivision (e).
Former 11 U.S.C. § 46(a), (b) (emphasis added). In Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S.
524, 538 (1900), the Supreme Court held that § 23(b) was in effect a grant of jurisdic-
tion subject to the defendant's consent. That is, it was a grant of jurisdiction over any
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Congress' power to authorize jurisdiction over a state law cause
of action between non-diverse parties where one of the parties
was in bankruptcy. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent,
emphatically stated: "No doubt Congress could authorize such
a suit." 3 Thus the Court recognized congressional power to
confer jurisdiction, but once again it did not explicitly analyze
the source of that power, or its limitations.
In National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co., 4 the Supreme Court addressed Congress' power to grant
federal courts jurisdiction over a controversy between a citizen
of the District of Columbia and a citizen of one of the states.
The case resulted in a five to four decision recognizing Con-
gress' constitutional power to grant the questioned jurisdiction;
but as in Marathon, there were four opinions and no five mem-
and all suits brought by the trustee subject to the condition of consent. This would
include summary and plenary jurisdiction, and would also include a non-diversity Mar-
athon "related to" claim brought by a trustee. The proviso was, however, that this
jurisdiction attached only if the defendant consented. The Bardes statement regarding
§ 23(b) was dictum. But this dictum was adopted in Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S.
367, 374 (1934) ("Section 23b was thus in effect a grant of jurisdiction subject to that
condition.").
Then, in the Chandler Act of 1934, Congress stated that § 23(b) was not applicable
to reorganizations. See Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642, 644-45 & n.3 (1947). In Aus-
trian, the trustee sought to bring a plenary suit against non-diverse defendants on a
state law claim. The trustee relied upon § 2(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, which con-
ferred jurisdiction on all bankruptcy courts of cases at "law and in equity as will
enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings under this Act .. .to ...
(7) Cause the estates of bankrupts to be collected, reduced to money and distributed,
and determine controversies in relation thereto, except as herein otherwise provided
.... A majority of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Vinson writing, concluded that
§ 2(a)(7) was a general jurisdictional grant sufficiently broad to encompass the case
before it, and that § 23(b) was essentially a limitation of that general jurisdiction. Jus-
tice Frankfurter, in dissent, argued that Bardes, Beeler, and other cases had construed
§ 2(a) as applying only to summary jurisdiction and that § 23(b), as interpreted,
granted plenary jurisdiction subject to the defendant's consent. Thus, to Frankfurter,
when Congress stated that § 23(b) did not apply to reorganization proceedings, that
meant there was no plenary jurisdiction over the suit before the court. See Austrian,
331 U.S. at 662 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 664 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice Frankfurter contended
that the amendment, when read with the Act as a whole, resulted in jurisdiction of all
plenary lawsuits in the district court where the reorganization was pending, but not in
other districts. Id. at 677-79.
For dicta in another case indicating that Congress has the power, although not yet
exercised, to confer upon the bankruptcy court jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights of
the trustee in property not in his or her possession and adversely held by the other
person, see Taubel--Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 430 (1924). Once again,
this type of case would be a "related to" case in today's vernacular. Cf. In re Lion
Capital Group, 46 Bankr. 850, 856 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). See generally supra note 20.
84. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
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bers of the Court could agree on any one holding. 5 Despite
their disagreement on reasoning and the result in the case
before them, all three justices who discussed the bankruptcy
jurisdiction over suits by or against the trustee found it
constitutional.
Justice Jackson argued that Beeler and Austrian did not"arise under" the laws of the United States, but because Con-
gress had the power to make uniform rules for bankruptcies
under article I, an article III judge could decide such cases
without regard to what article III said.86
In concluding that the bankruptcy jurisdiction at issue in
Beeler8 7 arose under the laws of the United States,88 Justice
Rutledge noted that Jackson's definition of "arising under"
jurisdiction confused cases dealing with statutory and constitu-
tional "arising under" jurisdiction. 89  Rutledge stated that
although the federal question jurisdiction statute required that
federal law create the plaintiff's cause of action before he or
she could litigate in federal court,' that did not mean Con-
gress could not expand "arising under" jurisdiction beyond
that statute's limits, as long as it did not exceed constitutional
85. As Justice Frankfurter said in concluding his dissent:
A substantial majority of the Court agrees that each of the two grounds urged
in support of the attempt by Congress to extend diversity jurisdiction to cases
involving citizens of the District of Columbia must be rejected-but not the
same majority. And so, conflicting minorities in combination bring to pass a
result-paradoxical as it may appear-which differing majorities of the Court
find insupportable.
Id. at 655 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 594-99. Of course, the article I power Jackson relied upon was Congress'
power to make uniform rules of bankruptcy. Id. at 594; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Jackson's claim that Austrian and Beeler did not arise under the laws of the
United States was also based in part on the Court's failure to expressly say in those
cases that they "arose under" federal law. Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 596.
Although Jackson concluded that Congress could grant article I jurisdiction to an
article III court, he felt that the Court should not reverse Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion in Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 445 (1804), which held that
a citizen of the District of Columbia did not have the standing of a citizen of one of the
states for purposes of article III, § 2 diversity jurisdiction. Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 587;
see also O'Donogue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933). Justices Black and Burton
joined Jackson. Justice Rutledge, joined by Justice Murphy, disagreed with Jackson's
article III/article I holding and would have overruled Hepburn. Id. at 625 (Rutledge,
J., concurring). Thus five justices affirmed the federal court's jurisdiction in the case
before it.
87. He did not discuss Austrian.
88. Id. at 611 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 611-17 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 613. See also Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust. 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983).
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limits on its power. In Rutledge's opinion, Beeler was a case in
which Congress had expanded federal question jurisdiction
beyond its general statutory bounds but still within constitu-
tional limits. Rutledge's point is important because he
expressly noted that the scope of the phrase "arising under" is
broader in article III than it is in the federal question statute.
Justice Frankfurter,9 ' in a dissent in Tidewater, also recog-
nized Congress' power to confer jurisdiction in the bankruptcy
cases. In a footnote he stated, in part:
When a petition for bankruptcy is filed, there may be
outstanding claims by the bankrupt against debtors and by
creditors against the bankrupt. Of course, Congress has
power to determine whether all such claims-those for, and
those against, the bankrupt estate-should be enforced
through the federal courts. That a particular claim dissoci-
ated from the fact of bankruptcy would have to be brought
in a state court for want of any ground of federal jurisdiction
is irrelevant. This is so because in the exercise of its power
to "pass uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies" Con-
gress may deem it desirable that the federal courts be uti-
lized for all the claims that pertain to the bankrupt estate
whether in the federal court in which the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding is pending or in a more convenient federal court.
The congeries of controversies thus brought into being by
reason of bankruptcy may be lodged in the federal courts
because they arise under "the Laws of the United States," to
wit, laws concerning the "subject of bankruptcies." It is a
matter of congressional policy whether there must be a con-
course of all claims affecting the bankrupt's estate in the
federal court in which the bankruptcy proceeding is pending
or whether auxiliary suits must be pursued in other federal
courts. 92
Frankfurter did not clearly explain the source of Con-
gress' power, but indicated that it involved "arising under"
jurisdiction and was related to Congress' power to make uni-
form rules for bankruptcy.
Frankfurter also argued that Congress lacked the power to
confer district court jurisdiction over the case before the Court
because a citizen of the District of Columbia was not a citizen
91. Frankfurter would not have overruled Hepburn. Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 654
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Of all the Tidewater opinions only Chief Justice Vinson's
opinion did not mention or discuss the bankruptcy cases.
92. 337 U.S. at 652 n.3 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
19871
28 University of Puget Sound Law Review
of a state, and thus there was no article III "diversity" and no
congressional power to confer such jurisdiction.93 He felt that
the "power of the federal courts to adjudicate merely because
of the citizenship of the parties" was limited to the particular
jurisdictional headings in article III and none of those included
jurisdiction over a dispute between a citizen of the District of
Columbia and a citizen of a state.94 Implicitly he rejected the
notion that the jurisdictional statute itself provided a law the
case could "arise under" when he said:
But if courts established under article III can exercise
wider jurisdiction than that defined and confined by article
III, and if they are available to effectuate the various sub-
stantive powers of Congress, such as the power to legislate
for the District of Columbia, what justification is there for
interpreting article III as imposing one restriction in the
exercise of those other powers of the Congress-the restric-
tion to the exercise of "judicial power"-yet not interpreting
it as imposing the restrictions that are most explicit, namely,
the particularization of the "cases" to which "the judicial
Power shall extend?, 95
Frankfurter went on to ask why, if Congress can pass a
statute conferring the jurisdiction at issue in Tidewater, could
it not pass a statute authorizing advisory opinions? In essence,
Frankfurter's argument is a slippery slope argument. What
Frankfurter did not address, or adequately explain, was the
apparent conflict between his footnote and his arguments
about the case before him. How could Congress have the
power to provide for non-diversity jurisdiction over state law
causes of action pursuant to its power to make uniform rules of
bankruptcy but not have the power to provide jurisdiction over
the Tidewater case pursuant to its power to legislate for the
District of Columbia?96 If article III limited jurisdiction in
Tidewater, why did it not limit it in Beeler and Austrian? Was
there some meaningful difference between the two? Were
Beeler and Austrian wrong? Was Frankfurter wrong in
Tidewater?
In his dissent in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,97
93. Id. at 652-55 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 650 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 648 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
97. 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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Frankfurter articulated an alternative basis for federal juris-
diction in Beeler and Austrian. He used this theory to explain
Beeler and Austrian in the context of rejecting the notion of
"protective jurisdiction" over labor disputes.98
"Protective jurisdiction," once the label is discarded,
cannot be justified under any view of the allowable scope to
be given to article III. "Protective jurisdiction" is a misused
label for the statute we are here considering. That rubric is
properly descriptive of safeguarding some of the indisputable
staple business of the federal courts. It is a radiation of an
existing jurisdiction. "Protective jurisdiction" cannot gener-
ate an independent source for adjudication outside of the
article III sanctions and what Congress has defined. The
theory must have as its sole justification a belief in the inad-
equacy of state tribunals in determining state law. The Con-
stitution reflects such a belief in the specific situation within
which the Diversity Clause was confined. The intention to
remedy such supposed defects was exhausted in this provi-
sion of article III. That this "protective" theory was not
adopted by Chief Justice Marshall [in Osborn] at a time
when conditions might have presented more substantial jus-
tification strongly suggests its lack of constitutional merit.
Moreover, Congress in its consideration of section 301 [of the
Taft-Hartley Act] nowhere suggested dissatisfaction with the
ability of state courts to administer state law properly. Its
concern was to provide access to the federal courts for easier
enforcement of state-created rights.9 9
Still the question remained as to how could there be juris-
diction in cases like Beeler or Austrian. Are they examples of
98. The question in Lincoln Mills was whether or not § 301 of the National Labor
Relations Management Act (Taft-Hartley Act) conferred jurisdiction over labor
disputes involving state law claims between management and unions. The case raised
protective jurisdiction questions in a relatively pure form. Avoiding these questions,
the majority of the court, Justice Douglas writing, concluded that § 301 was not merely
a jurisdictional provision, but rather was a "substantive" grant of power, as well as a
grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts, to develop a federal common law in certain
labor matters. Id. at 456-57. Frankfurter dissented on this point, and also rejected
Congress' constitutional power to confer "protective" jurisdiction. Id. at 469-84
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). There have been a number of general discussions of the
issues raised in Lincoln Mills. See, e.g., HART & WECHLSER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at
859-70; D. CURRIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 100-03 (1981); Bickel &
Wellington, Legislative Purpose in the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1957); Forrester, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Labor
Disputes, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 114 (1948); Wollett & Wellington, Federalism
and Breach of the Labor Agreement, 7 STAN. L. REV. 445 (1955).
99. 353 U.S. at 474-75 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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"radiation(s) of an existing jurisdiction" and the Tidewater
case is not?
To explain the bankruptcy cases, Frankfurter stated that
an entire bankruptcy case may be viewed as one piece of litiga-
tion. Then he analogized all proceedings by and against the
trustee to pendent or ancillary jurisdiction cases. He con-
tended that all suits by or against the trustee, even though in
several federal courts, are pendent or ancillary to the main
bankruptcy proceeding.100 Although he did not expressly say
so, pendent or ancillary jurisdiction is linguistically similar to
the notion of a "radiation." Several recent cases have adopted
the pendent jurisdiction theory; but before analyzing it further,
this discussion of Supreme Court cases leads once again to
Marathon.
In Marathon, Justice Brennan assumed that an article III
court, rather than a "bankruptcy court," would have had juris-
diction over Marathon, even absent diversity. In a footnote he
stated: "This claim may be adjudicated in federal court on the
basis of its relationship to the petition for reorganization. 101
But Justice Brennan did not articulate an analytical basis for
his statement. Justice Burger, in his dissent, stated that all
Congress needed to do to cure the supposed constitutional
defect in Marathon was to refer cases like it to the district
100. In full, Frankfurter stated that:
[T]he bankruptcy decisions may be justified by the scope of the bankruptcy
power, which may be deemed to sweep within its scope interests analytically
outside the "federal question" category, but sufficiently related to the main
purpose of bankruptcy to call for comprehensive treatment. See National
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 652, n.3 (concurring in
part, dissenting in part). Also, although a particular suit may be brought by a
trustee in a district other than the one in which the principal proceedings are
pending, if all the suits by the trustee, even though in many federal courts,
are regarded as one litigation for the collection and apportionment of the
bankrupt's property, a particular suit by the trustee under state law to recover
a specific piece of property might be analogized to the ancillary or pendent
jurisdiction cases in which, in the disposition of a cause of action, federal
courts may pass on state grounds for recovery that are joined to federal
grounds. See Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 243 (1933); Siler v. Louisville &
Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909); but see Mishkin, 53 COL. L. REV., at
194, n. 161.
353 U.S. at 483 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
In In re Bobroff, the court approvingly quoted Frankfurter, but then concluded
that there was no jurisdiction because the case was not "related to" the bankruptcy. 43
Bankr. 746, 751 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
101. 458 U.S. at 72 n.26 (Brennan, J., plurality). In support of this statement,
Brennan cited Austrian, Beeler, Tidewater, Lincoln Mills, and Osborn.
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court for decision. His palliative clearly contemplates federal
subject matter jurisdiction over such cases.
Since passage of the Bankruptcy Amendment and Federal
Judgeships Act of 1984, several courts have considered the con-
stitutionality of federal "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction
and have upheld it on various grounds. 10 2  In In re WWG
Industries,"°3 the court relied upon principles of ancillary juris-
diction to sustain the court's "related to" jurisdiction. 10 4 The
court stated that ancillary jurisdiction was "the only constitu-
tional basis on which to explain Congress's grant of subject
matter jurisdiction to this Court ... ."105 In In re Environmen-
tal Research & Development,0 6 the court relied principally on
concepts of pendent jurisdiction to sustain jurisdiction over a
malpractice claim against attorneys allegedly involved in a
fraudulent conveyance.0 7 Similarly, in In re Bible Voice,'0
the court sustained subject matter jurisdiction over a debtor's
legal malpractice action, relying upon Brennan's footnote in
Marathon and upon Beeler and Austrian."°9 In a footnote, the
court also mentioned the concept of protective jurisdiction; 110
however, its analysis on the jurisdictional point was brief and
conclusory. In In re Tidewater Group, Inc.,"' the court relied
102. As noted above, other courts have refused to recognize federal jurisdiction
where a case is merely "related to" a case under title 11, absent an independent basis
for federal jurisdiction. See supra note 57 and text accompanying notes 55-57.
103. 44 Bankr. 287 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
104. In re WWG involved a claim by the debtor's assignee to collect an account
receivable. There was diversity of citizenship. The precise question before the court
was whether it was necessary to analyze the defendant's "minimum contacts" with the
forum state to determine whether there was in personam jurisdiction, which is what a
federal court in a diversity case must do, or whether the court's only concern was with
the defendant's contacts with the United States, which is the standard for measuring
in personam jurisdiction in federal question cases. The court concluded that the
federal bankruptcy "related to" jurisdiction arose under the laws of the United States
and thus national contacts was the appropriate standard.
105. Id. at 290.
106. 46 Bankr. 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
107. Environmental Research is truly a pendent jurisdiction case in that the claim
against the attorneys arose out of the same "common nucleus of operative facts" as the
fraudulent conveyance claim. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715 (1966); see generally Miller, Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 1
(1985) [hereinafter Miller]. Thus in Environmental Research it was not necessary to
strain the concepts of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction to find jurisdiction in the case
before the court. Ultimately, the court deferred decision on the merits until after the
underlying fraudulent transfer case was resolved. 46 Bankr. at 780.
108. 34 Bankr. 733 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
109. Id. at 736.
110. Id. at 736 n.1.
111. 63 Bankr. 670 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986).
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upon ancillary jurisdiction. But in all these cases the discus-
sion is terse and analytically unsatisfactory. Critics no doubt
contend that any analysis upholding jurisdiction has to be
unsatisfactory because there is no constitutional subject matter
jurisdiction over the case. But the cases described herein
remain, and they suggest several theories justifying the"related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction: Justice Jackson's Tidewa-
ter argument, pendent and/or ancillary jurisdiction, and pro-
tective jurisdiction. Another theory, the original ingredient
theory, has its genesis in Osborn.
V. THE ORIGINAL INGREDIENT THEORY AND PENDENT AND
ANCILLARY JURISDICTION Do NOT ADEQUATELY
EXPLAIN THE "RELATED To" BANKRUPTCY
JURISDICTION
A. Osborn's Original Ingredient Theory is Inadequate to
Explain That Case or the "Related To"
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
In Osborn, the Supreme Court upheld a jurisdictional stat-
ute providing federal jurisdiction over any suit brought by or
against the Bank of the United States.112 Osborn itself
involved the state's power to tax the Bank of the United
States, which was clearly a federal question." 3 But in expan-
sive dicta, Chief Justice Marshall said that Congress had power
under the "arising under" clause to extend the federal judicial
power to "every case that might involve an issue of federal
law.""' 4 Marshall relied heavily on the fact that the bank was
federally incorporated and that all its powers to act depended
upon its federal charter and upon federal law. In a companion
case, United States v. Planter's Bank of Georgia,"' the Court
tersely sustained jurisdiction where the bank had brought suit
as the bearer of negotiable notes issued by a state bank and
involving only state law claims." 6 Planter's Bank was within
the Osborn dicta.
One popular interpretation of Marshall's Osborn opinion
would uphold original federal jurisdiction whenever a federal
112. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
113. See HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 866.
114. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 224. Cf. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 481-82
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (limiting Osborn to its facts and historical settings).
115. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
116. Cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
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question is an "original ingredient" of the plaintiff's case. I17
An "original [federal] ingredient" is one that the court must
resolve, either implicitly or explicitly, in plaintiff's favor for
plaintiff to win its case.'18 In Osborn, and more importantly in
Planter's Bank, federal law was an original ingredient of the
bank's claim because in both cases the bank had to establish its
capacity to contract and/or its right to sue. This was so even if
these issues were not raised because recovery logically
required their resolution, even if implicitly." 9 The parties
need not necessarily raise a federal question in order for there
to be an original ingredient. There must only be a potential for
a federal question to be raised.120
The "original ingredient" interpretation does explain Lath-
rop, Beeler, and Austrian, the bankruptcy trustee suits. In
those cases the trustee received his or her authority to sue
from a federal statute, like the bank's charter in Osborn. One
could argue that all litigation involving the trustee could be
constitutionally based in federal court because questions con-
cerning the propriety of the trustee's appointment or his capac-
ity to sue or be sued might arise in any case. Thus federal law
117. See, e.g., Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 968-69.
118. See, e.g., Hornstein, Federalism, Judicial Power and the "Arising Under"
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A Hierarchical Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 563 (1980);
Note, The Outer Limits of "Arising Under", 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 978 (1979); Note, The
Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 3.
119. See supra note 118.
120. When a Bank sues, the first question which presents itself, and which lies
at the foundation of the cause, is, has this legal entity a right to sue? Has it a
right to come, not into this Court particularly, but into any Court? This
depends on a law of the United States. The next question is, has this being a
right to make this particular contract? If this question be decided in the
negative, the cause is determined against the plaintiff; and this question, too,
depends entirely on a law of the United States.... [T]he question respecting
the right to make a particular contract, or to acquire a particular property, or
to sue on account of a particular injury, belongs to every particular case, and
may be renewed in every case. The question forms an original ingredient in
every cause. Whether it be in fact relied on or not, in the defence it is still a
part of the cause, and may be relied on. The right of the plaintiff to sue,
cannot depend on the defence which the defendant may choose to set up. His
right to sue is anterior to that defence, and must depend on the state of things
when the action is brought. The question, which the case involves, then, must
determine its character, whether those questions be made in the cause or not.
... [T]he validity of the contract [in this case] depends on a law of the
United States .... The act of Congress is its foundation. The contract could
never have been made, but under the authority of that act. The act itself is
the first ingredient in the case, is its origin, is that from which every other
part arises.
22 U.S. at 823-25.
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is an original ingredient in any suit brought by a trustee in
bankruptcy. However, the original ingredient theory does not
go far enough, because a trustee is not the only "entity" that
might want to sue in federal court on a "related to" claim.
The question is whether a "debtor in possession" should
have the same right to bring suits in federal courts as a feder-
ally appointed trustee. A "debtor in possession" is a debtor in
a Chapter 11 reorganization case who has possession of his or
her assets before, or in the absence of, the appointment of a
trustee.121 It is merely a technical name for a debtor that con-
tinues in possession of his or her assets during the reorganiza-
tion. There is no appointment involved and no change in the
debtor's identity. The court may never appoint a trustee, in
which case the debtor in possession continues to hold all his or
her assets during the reorganization proceeding. The debtor in
possession has all the powers of the reorganization trustee
except the right to compensation.122 In the absence of a con-
trary court order, the debtor in possession has the right to
operate the debtor's business.1 23 Thus a debtor will frequently
retain possession of assets and operate its business in a reor-
ganization. The debtor in possession serves an important pur-
pose in the reorganization context. The existence of the debtor
in possession necessarily eliminates the unnecessary expense
of appointing a trustee, prevents inefficient operation while a
trustee learns the business, and facilitates reorganization as
opposed to liquidation. Thus, the existence of the "debtor in
possession" doctrine furthers the ends of efficient
reorganization.
The provision for the "debtor in possession" also works
hand-in-hand with the fresh start doctrine. It allows the
debtor to stay involved and hopefully survive bankruptcy or
re-emerge in a meaningful role. Given the beneficent ends the
existence of the debtor in possession serves as well as the
almost exact similarity between its powers and the trustee's, it
would be ironic and illogical if the Constitution required all
non-diverse "related to" claims brought by a debtor in posses-
sion to be litigated in state court but allowed similar suits
brought by a trustee to be litigated in federal court. But this is
121. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1982).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). See also 5 L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1101.01
(15th ed. 1985).
123. 11 U.S.C. § 1108. See also 5 L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1101.01 (15th
ed. 1985).
[Vol. 11:1
"Related To" Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
exactly the result that the "original ingredient" theory yields
because the debtor in possession is the debtor itself; it is not a
federally created entity like the Bank of the United States or
the bankruptcy trustee.
Of course, one could solve the problem by saying that the
debtor in possession was a creation of federal law. But
accepting that contention points out the intellectual hollow-
ness of the original ingredient theory. If all Congress has to do
to grant federal jurisdiction, without providing a rule of deci-
sion, is to "create" a federal juridical entity, then whenever it
wanted a federal court to hear a case Congress could so legis-
late by engaging in semantics. For instance, if plaintiff A and
defendant B are both residents of Alaska, Congress could pro-
vide federal jurisdiction for their disputes by enacting a statute
calling A, "federal plaintiff A." Then, arguably, there is an
original ingredient. But if Congress desired a federal forum
for a whole class of litigation, it could not provide it without
first creating a federal "juridical entity." Thus the original
ingredient theory is either misleading and trivial, or it does not
go far enough to protect federal interests.
Certainly Marshall believed that more was at stake in
Osborn than the principle that an original ingredient of federal
law provided constitutional "arising under" jurisdiction. As
many have pointed out, Congress, in enacting the Osborn juris-
dictional statute, and Marshall, in interpreting it, were no
doubt concerned with providing the Bank of the United States
with a federal forum for all its litigation.124 Commentators and
judges have relied on Marshall's alleged concern with provid-
ing a federal forum and on his holding in Osborn for the propo-
sition that Congress may "protect" certain litigants or interests
by providing a federal forum, even in the absence of a federal
124. As Shulman and Jaegerman noted:
Marshall was apparently anxious to establish the validity of a grant of
federal jurisdiction in any suits by or against the Bank on ordinary
commercial transactions. This concern is easily understandable. The
Government was interested as an owner of the Bank and the Bank was
performing governmental service. Moreover, the Bank was the object of great
popular hatred and of measures of reprisal by many state legislatures. It was
sadly in need of a federal haven for its litigation. The doctrinal channel
leading to that haven was quite obvious, once discovered. Whatever the claim
it made, a suit by the Bank raised a federal question.
Shulman & Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure, 45
YALE L.J. 393, 404-05 (1936) (footnote omitted).
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rule of decision.125 In reference to the "protective jurisdiction"
explanation of Osborn one may recall Frankfurter's Lincoln
Mills dissent. Therein he contended that reading Osborn to
provide for "protective jurisdiction" was improper, for if such a
concept existed Marshall himself would have relied upon it
and he did not. But Osborn is a difficult and long opinion. One
must concentrate on its result, its political context, and its
application to Planter's Bank, not just its language. Likewise,
one often must look at a series of cases to discern a pattern
before extrapolating a broad rule. Lining Osborn up with
Lathrop, Beeler, and Austrian, a broad rule authorizing protec-
tive jurisdiction takes shape.
B. Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction Fail to Persuasively
Explain "Related To" Bankruptcy Cases
Pendent and ancillary jurisdiction derive from Osborn,
wherein Chief Justice Marshall highlighted the importance of
a federal court's ability to decide the entire case before it.' 26
However, as the court pointed out in WWG, the use of ancil-
lary and/or pendent jurisdiction to justify "related to" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction strains those concepts, especially where the"related to" action is pending in a court or district other than
the one where the debtor filed its bankruptcy petition. 27
Pendent jurisdiction commonly arises when the plaintiff
has a jurisdictionally sufficient claim to which it appends a
jurisdictionally insufficient claim.128 According to the Supreme
125. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, Local Union 25, AFL v. W.L. Mead, 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir. 1956).
But see Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320 (2nd Cir. 1981), rev'd
on other grounds, 461 U.S. 480 (1984). See generally D. CURRIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
IN A NUTSHELL 100-03 (1981); HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 415-18, 866-
70; Bickell & Wellington, Legislative Purpose in the Judicial Process: The Lincoln
Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957); Mishkin, supra note 3, at 184-96; Wechsler,
supra note 3, at 224-25; Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at
933; Note, Federal Jurisdiction-Protective Jurisdiction and Adoption as Alternative
Techniques for Conferring Jurisdiction on Federal Courts in Consumer Class Actions,
69 MICH. L. REV. 710 (1971).
126. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
127. In re WWG Industries, 44 Bankr. 287, 290 (N.D. Ga. 1984) ("The concept of
ancillary jurisdiction is clearly extended in this non-core bankruptcy proceeding where
the state law issues are contained in a separate action related to the federal statutory
action rather than in the same action as ancillary claims."). See also Note, The Theory
of Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 933. For a discussion of pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction over a non-"related to" bankruptcy claim, see In re Coral
Petroleum, Inc., 62 Bankr. 699 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
128. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 107, at 2.
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Court in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,' 29 a pen-
dent claim may be constitutionally appended to a jurisdiction-
ally sufficient claim if both arise out of "a common nucleus of
operative fact '"'3 and the claims are such that they would nor-
mally be litigated together. If those conditions are satisfied,
the Gibbs court concluded that the sufficient claim and the
pendent claim are part of one "constitutional case" and could
be litigated together.' 3 ' Under the Gibbs test, it is difficult to
see how a contract claim against a third-party can arise out of
the debtor's bankruptcy. It arguably arises out of a more par-
ticular and different fact situation, and the parties normally
would not litigate it with the bankruptcy, although this portion
of the test seems incongruous here. If the defendant's breach
of contract in some way caused the bankruptcy, perhaps one
might argue that both cases arose out of a "common nucleus of
operative fact." But even in that circumstance, it requires an
expansive view of "common nucleus" to find jurisdiction.
At the time Frankfurter relied on pendent jurisdiction to
justify jurisdiction in Lathrop, Beeler, and Austrian, the test
for pendent jurisdiction was even narrower than the Gibbs"common nucleus of operative fact" test. At that time, the suf-
ficient claim and the pendent claim had to be part of the same"cause of action.'1 32 It is extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to analytically conclude that a breach of contract claim against
a third-party is part of the same cause of action as a bank-
ruptcy petition.
These problems are exaggerated when one considers that
the debtor might bring the breach of contract action in a court
other than the one where the bankruptcy is pending. Consid-
ering a "related to" claim in one district as pendent to a bank-
ruptcy case pending in another district would be a unique
application of the pendent jurisdiction concept.
Additionally, the "related to" claim involves not only a
pendent claim but a pendent party. It is a non-federal claim
against a non-diverse defendant.'33  In any non-diversity"related to" claim brought by the trustee or debtor in posses-
sion, the defendant will be a pendent party. Although the''common nucleus of operative fact" test nominally applies to
129. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
130. Id. at 725.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
133. See generally Currie, Pendent Parties, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 753 (1978).
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the joining of pendent parties, the Supreme Court has been
especially strict in its application of the doctrine in that con-
text.1 3 4  In refusing to find pendent party jurisdiction in Ald-
inger v. Howard, 35 the Court stated: "If the new party sought
to be joined is not otherwise subject to federal jurisdiction,
there is a more serious obstacle to the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction than if parties already before the court are
required to litigate a state law claim."'36 Thus Aldinger and
other cases, whether decided rightly or wrongly,137 operate as a
significant obstacle to a federal court's exercise of pendent
party jurisdiction.
There are similar problems with using ancillary jurisdic-
tion to justify "related to" jurisdiction. Courts have long recog-
nized that a federal court has ancillary jurisdiction to protect
or decide claims to property in its possession. 38 It is hard to
analogize a "related to" claim against a non-diverse third-party
to an action deciding a claim to or protecting property within
the court's jurisdiction. 3 9
Courts also use ancillary jurisdiction in reference to coun-
terclaims,' 40 cross-claims, and third-party claims.141  Even in
134. Id. at 766 ("Zahn is a bad apple.").
135. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). In its decision the Court relied principally upon
congressional intent in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It found no pendent party
jurisdiction over a county on a state law claim in a case involving § 1983 claims against
county officials, even though the Gibbs criteria were satisfied. The decision, if not the
reasoning, of Aldinger was overruled in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658 (1978), which held that § 1983 actions may be brought against a county.
136. 427 U.S. at 18. See also Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973)
(holding that in a class action where jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship,
class members whose claims are for less than $10,000 cannot be joined as pendent
parties to the named representatives' jurisdictionally sufficient claims).
137. See Currie, Pendent Parties, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 753 (1978). Recently, in a
related context, the Court has held that in a case involving pendant claims removed to
federal court, the federal court may, in its discretion, remand the case to state court
after all federal issues are resolved or settled and only pendent state claims remain.
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 56 U.S.L.W. 4101 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1988) (No. 86-
1021).
138. See, e.g., Fulton National Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276 (1925). Interpleader
provides another example of "limited" diversity federal jurisdiction. Statutory
interpleader only requires diversity jurisdiction between two of the claimants to the
stake. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 22 interpleader, diversity is only required between the
stakeholder and one of the claimants.
139. Interestingly, in Lathrop, the Court did refer to the necessity of prosecuting
"[p]roceedings ancillary" to the bankruptcy proceeding in districts other than where
the bankruptcy itself was pending. 91 U.S. at 518.
140. See, e.g., In re Earl Roggenbuck Farms Co., 51 Bankr. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1985) (rejecting claim that bankruptcy courts do not have power to exercise ancillary
jurisdiction and exercising jurisdiction over a cross-claim because 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) is
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these cases the Supreme Court has not been willing to extend
ancillary jurisdiction over a claim by the original plaintiff
against a non-diverse third-party defendant.142 In such a case,
the Court has reasoned that the outcome of the plaintiff's
allegedly ancillary claim is independent of the result in the
main case, and that in the plaintiff versus third-party defend-
ant situation, the plaintiff has not been "hauled into court"
against its wil1 43 like other parties who can properly assert
ancillary claims. In a Marathon-type "related to" case, the
trustee or debtor in possession is in the position of the plaintiff
in the plaintiff versus third-party defendant cases. The result
in the "related to" case is independent of what happens in the
bankruptcy proceeding itself, and the plaintiff, trustee, or
debtor in possession is not hauled into court against its will.1 4 4
At best, then, it is questionable whether a non-diversity Mara-
thon-type "related to" case is truly "ancillary" to the bank-
ruptcy proceeding itself.
There is also a potential problem with appending any
claim to the bankruptcy proceeding in order to obtain jurisdic-
tion over the "related to" claim. That problem arises because
the bankruptcy proceeding itself is arguably not a case or con-
troversy, and federal courts may only take jurisdiction over
cases or controversies.1 41 If a bankruptcy proceeding is not a"case," then logically it is impossible to append a jurisdiction-
a statutory grant of ancillary jurisdiction). Cf. In re Yagow, 53 Bankr. 737 (D.N.D.
1985) (28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) grants ancillary jurisdiction only over compulsory
counterclaims, not permissive counterclaims).
141. See generally Miller, supra note 107.
142. See, e.g., Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). In
Kroger, the plaintiff, an Iowa resident, sued a Nebraska power company for the
wrongful death of her husband, invoking diversity jurisdiction. The power company
filed a third-party claim against Owen. After the district court granted the power
company summary judgment, the plaintiff proceeded to trial against Owen. During
trial it was learned for the first time that Owen's principal place of business was Iowa,
not Nebraska, and thus there was no diversity. The trial court still proceeded with the
trial, and the court of appeals affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court reversed, finding no subject matter jurisdiction.
143. Id. at 378 (White and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
144. An exception would be if an involuntary petition were filed against the
debtor, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 303. However, even then the case is not similar,
because the defendant in the "related to" case will by definition not be one of those
who filed a claim against the debtor, in which case the debtor's counterclaim would
have been a core proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).
145. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See also Correspondence of the Justices (1773),
quoted in HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 64-66. For the proposition that
the bankruptcy case itself may not be a case or controversy, see DEMASCIO, NORTON, &
LIEB, supra note 26, at 1-2. It is hard to imagine how a naturalization proceeding could
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ally insufficient claim to that non-case and conclude that fed-
eral jurisdiction exists.
Although ancillary and pendent jurisdiction do not explain
the "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, an examination of the
justifications underlying those doctrines points to the notion of"protective jurisdiction."
Pendent jurisdiction is expressly justified on grounds of
convenience and judicial economy.14' But economy hardly
seems sufficient in and of itself to override the article III limi-
tations on federal jurisdiction. Several commentators have
suggested an alternative justification for pendent jurisdic-
tion.147 They argue that a court may approve pendent jurisdic-
tion to help vindicate federal rights. If a plaintiff had a federal
claim and a state law claim against the same defendant and
pendent jurisdiction were nonexistent, the plaintiff would be
faced with a difficult choice. She could either prosecute both
the state and federal claims in state court, or bring two sepa-
rate actions, one in state court and one in federal court.148 This
situation may present an economic as well as a practical
dilemma for the plaintiff. Prosecuting two lawsuits means
twice the cost, and as Professor Arthur Miller has pointed out,
the risk of inconsistent results. 49 Consequently, the plaintiff
may decide to bring just one suit in state court alleging both
federal and state claims. However, the jurisdictional scheme
will have then deterred the plaintiff from asserting her federal
claims in the forum that the Constitution and Congress have
created to vindicate, enforce, and protect those rights.150 To
avoid this dilemma and the effect it may have on the plaintiff's
ability and willingness to assert her federal claims in federal
court, a federal court may invoke pendent jurisdiction to allow
the plaintiff to prosecute both her federal and state claims in
federal court. Put differently, pendent jurisdiction protects the
plaintiff's right to assert her federal claims in federal court.
This view of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction is consis-
be a case or controversy and a bankruptcy would not. See, e.g., Tutun v. United States,
270 U.S. 568 (1926).
146. See, e.g., United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966);
Currie, Pendant Parties, 45 CHI. L. REV. 753 (1978); Miller, supra note 107.
147. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 922-23; Miller, supra
note 107, at 4.
148. If the federal claim is one over which the federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction, then the plaintiff has no real choice but to bring two suits.
149. Miller, supra note 107, at 4.
150. See generally Mishkin, supra note 3.
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tent with the allegedly primary justification for federal juris-
diction in Osborn, providing a "friendly" forum for all the
Bank's litigation. In this way Congress hoped to protect the
Bank from state court bias unrelated to the merits. It is also
consistent with Justice Bradley's concerns in Lathrop that a
uniform system of bankruptcy might entail federal jurisdiction
over state law claims to prevent "embarrassments" in state
court. The task remains to define and justify the concept of
protective jurisdiction in a way that consistently explains the
decided cases and the "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction, and
that meshes with accepted views of congressional power in
other areas.
VI. PROTECTIVE JURISDICTION IS THE MOST PERSUASIVE
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE "RELATED To" BANKRUPTCY
JURISDICTION
At this point, it would be helpful to restate a working defi-
nition of protective jurisdiction. Protective jurisdiction exists
whenever Congress chooses to provide for original federal
court jurisdiction in a case between non-diverse parties where
state law governs the decision of the case. The "related to"
bankruptcy jurisdiction over a non-diversity state law case fits
within this definition.151
As noted above, article III provides the power structure
for the federal courts. If Congress grants a federal court juris-
diction over a class of litigation that does not fit within one of
the eleven enumerated jurisdictional headings, there is no con-
stitutional power and the court must refuse to hear the case.
By definition, when a question of protective jurisdiction arises
there is no diversity of citizenship; thus, that heading of consti-
151. See, e.g., Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 3. As noted,
the statutory test for whether or not federal question jurisdiction exists depends upon
whether or not the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint reveals that his or her claim is
based upon federal law. See supra text accompanying notes 58-64. That is, does
federal law create the plaintiff's cause of action? Clearly, the statutory definition of
arising under fits within the constitutional definition. But it is also clear that the
constitutional definition is broader, and that it includes cases where a defense that may
or may not be determinative is governed by federal law. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of
the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 871 (1824) (Johnson, J., dissenting); see also
Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880). Cases where federal law provides a defense
are excluded from the definition of protective jurisdiction. Protective jurisdiction is
limited to the cases described in the text, that is, cases where there is no diversity of
citizenship and state law governs the decision of the case in that it not only creates
plaintiff's cause of action but also governs any and all defenses that may be raised.
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tutional jurisdiction is ruled out. Likewise, nine of the remain-
ing ten categories generally can be eliminated-the United
States is not a party, there is no admiralty case, etc. The
remaining article III heading is jurisdiction over cases "arising
under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
The appropriate question is then whether a grant of protective
jurisdiction "arises under" the laws of the United States. If it
does not, there is no constitutional jurisdiction. If it does, then
Congress has pushed, but not exceeded, the limits of "arising
under" in article III.
Commentators have posited several reasons to explain
why Congress may want to provide jurisdiction without provid-
ing a rule of decision. Congress may feel that there are certain
institutional advantages that the federal courts provide.15 2 Con-
gress may believe that federal procedures are superior,1 53  or
that state courts would discriminate against certain classes of
litigants or litigation.'5s Perhaps Congress might conclude that
litigation in state courts would unduly hamper some federal
program. Congress might also feel that federal jurisdiction is a
less intrusive alternative to federal preemption. Congress may
also believe that federal litigation would be quicker than state
litigation in a certain area, and that delay may adversely affect
some valid federal interest, such as an interest in the efficient
operation of the bankruptcy system.
It has been said that a majority of the Supreme Court has
never endorsed the concept of protective jurisdiction. 55 At the
same time, the Court as a whole has not rejected the theory. 5 6
152. See, e.g., Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 3, at 566-76; Note, The Theory of
Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 949-50.
153. See supra note 152.
154. See supra note 152.
155. See, e.g., Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 937. In
a footnote the author discusses the willingness of at least two members of the court to
find protective jurisdiction over matters involving § 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act. He
states:
At one time, however, Justices Burton and Harlan approved the concept of
protective jurisdiction over the vigorous dissent of Justice Frankfurter. See
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957) (Burton &
Harlan, JJ., concurring); id. at 469-84 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The
majority deftly avoided the need for protective jurisdiction, finding § 301(a) of
the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976), the source of federal common
law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. 353 U.S. at 456-
57. Cases under § 301 thereafter arose under federal common law.
Id. at 937-38 n.32.
156. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 n.17
(1984).
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Moreover, the theory meaningfully explains the results in
Osborn, Lathrop, Beeler, and Schumacher without resort to the"original ingredient" notion outlined above and without
unduly stretching pendent and ancillary jurisdiction beyond
recognition.
A. Theories of Protective Jurisdiction
Others have examined the "protective jurisdiction" ques-
tion15 7 and have articulated their theories of the jurisdiction.
A short review and critique of those theories follows.
1. Justice Jackson's Article I Argument
In Tidewater, Justice Jackson articulated what Professor
Goldberg-Ambrose has termed the "Effectuation Theory" of
protective jurisdiction.58 In actuality Jackson's analysis does
not involve protective jurisdiction at all because, unlike any
other theory of protective jurisdiction, his analysis ignores arti-
cle III's "arising under" requirement. He argued that as long
as Congress acted pursuant to one of its article I powers and
provided federal jurisdiction, a federal court could hear the
case; article III would be irrelevant. Pointing to Lathrop, Bee-
ler, and Austrian, he claimed that federal courts could take
jurisdiction of non-diversity cases that did not "arise under" a
law of the United States. To Jackson, those cases did not arise
under federal law because state law created the cause of
action. 59 However, as Justice Rutledge noted, Jackson's defi-
nition of arising under only applies to the statutory lan-
guage,'1 6 not the constitutional phrase. Jackson confused the
two standards and the authority he cited reveals this confu-
sion.16' Therefore, it cannot be said that article III imposes no
limits on Congress' article I power to create and oversee the
lower federal courts. Although Jackson's arguments have
gained little or no subsequent support and commentators have
roundly criticized him, 62 it should be noted that the "related
to" jurisdiction passes muster under Jackson's Effectuation
Theory. Congress has power, under article I, to enact uniform
157. See commentators cited supra note 3.
158. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 3, at 583.
159. 337 U.S. at 595-99.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
161. 337 U.S. at 597-98.
162. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 415-18.
1987]
44 University of Puget Sound Law Review
rules in bankruptcies. 63 Consequently, Jackson would have
argued that the "related to" jurisdiction is constitutional, even
though he would find that such cases do not "arise under" fed-
eral law.
2. Wechsler's Greater Power Theory
Professor Herbert Wechsler presented a variant of Jack-
son's arguments that respects article III's structural limitations
on federal judicial power. 164 Wechsler argued that if Congress
acted pursuant to some article I power, then it could provide
for federal jurisdiction without necessarily mandating a federal
rule of decision. Accommodating article III, Wechsler posited
that such a jurisdictional statute would "arise under" federal
law.'65 Precisely, he articulated his theory as follows:
The power of the Congress to confer the federal judicial
power must extend, as Marshall held, to every case that
might involve an issue under federal law. It should extend, I
think, beyond this to all cases in which Congress has author-
ity to make the rule to govern disposition of the controversy
but is content instead to let the states provide the rule so
long as jurisdiction to enforce it has been vested in a federal
court. Where, for example, Congress by the commerce
power can declare as federal law that contracts of a given
kind are valid and enforceable, it must be free to take the
lesser step of drawing suits upon such contracts to the dis-
trict courts without displacement of the states as sources of
the operative, substantive law. A grant of jurisdiction is, in
short, one mode by which the Congress may assert its regu-
latory powers. A case is one "arising under" federal law
within the sense of article III whenever it is comprehended
in a valid grant of jurisdiction as well as when its disposition
must be governed by the national law.'66
There are several limits on Wechsler's definition of "aris-
ing under." Implicitly, there must be a "case or controversy,"
as article III mandates. Congress cannot ask a court to per-
form a non-judicial function. 167 Explicitly, Congress must act
pursuant to a valid article I power. Congress must have the
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 3, at 585-86.
164. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 224-25; see also Note, The Theory of Protective
Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 959.
165. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 224-25.
166. Id.
167. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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power to prescribe a substantive rule of decision in the case. If
so, Congress can take the "lesser step" of providing a federal
forum without providing a federal rule of decision.
Commentators have objected to Wechsler's quoted justifi-
cation of protective jurisdiction on several grounds. Professor
Goldberg-Ambrose has noted that the greater power (to enact
a rule of substantive law) does not always include the lesser (to
provide a federal forum without displacing state decisional
law).168 She points to the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions that "prohibits Congress from placing certain conditions
on the enjoyment of government benefits that Congress could
withhold altogether." 169  Then Goldberg-Ambrose refers to
Fontiero v. Richardson7 ° for the proposition that "Congress
may not unequally allocate benefits which it may withhold
altogether.' 71 She also relies on Congress' alleged inability to
withdraw federal jurisdiction in an attempt to deny an individ-
ual's constitutional rights, even though Congress has plenary
control over federal jurisdiction. 172 Finally, Goldberg-Ambrose
points to United States v. Klein,173 arguing that Congress'
inability to withdraw jurisdiction to dictate the result in a par-
ticular case, even though it could withdraw jurisdiction alto-
gether, is another exception to the greater power theory.
Her first three examples involve areas where an independ-
ent individual constitutional right forecloses congressional con-
ditions or withdrawal of jurisdiction. There are no
independent constitutional "individual rights" at issue in the
case of protective jurisdiction. Whether structural limits
impose similar limits when the issue is the allocation of power
between federal and state governments is the crux of the pro-
tective jurisdiction question, and will be discussed in more
detail below.
Klein should be read narrowly. Professor Goldberg-
168. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 3, at 590.
169. Id.
170. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
171. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 3, at 590.
172. Professor Goldberg-Ambrose cites Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366
(1974), for the proposition that Congress may not withdraw jurisdiction to deny
individuals their constitutional rights. However, the statement in Johnson v. Robison
is dictum because the court resolved the jurisdictional question as a matter of statutory
interpretation rather than constitutional power. Thus the proposition is still open to
question. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 3, at 590 n.263. See also HART & WECHSLER
(2d ed.), supra note 3, at 318-21, 336-38.
173. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
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Ambrose cites it as a case limiting Congress' power to with-
draw jurisdiction when to do so would dictate a result in a par-
ticular case. 74 But in Klein the Court was faced with a
situation where Congress attempted to prescribe how a court
should decide a question of fact-the meaning of a pardon. 175
Equally important, Congress' intrusion on the judiciary also
infringed upon the executive's sphere by impairing the effect
of a presidential pardon. 7 ' Neither of these problems present
themselves in the protective jurisdiction context, especially not
in the "related to" bankruptcy context. The protective juris-
diction question involves the relationship between federal
power and state power, not the relationships between state and
citizen or between the coordinate branches of the federal
government.
Others criticize Wechsler's protective jurisdiction thesis
because it is somewhat artificial. They contend that it is fre-
quently difficult, if not impossible, to say which is the greater
power and which is the lesser. One may argue that the power
to infringe upon state control over the interpretation and
development of state law is greater than the power to provide
a mere substantive rule of decision.177
Still others posit that Wechsler's requirement that Con-
gress have the power to enact a substantive rule of decision for
a case before it can provide for federal jurisdiction unnecessa-
rily limits protective jurisdiction.17' That is, Wechsler did not
go far enough. There may well be cases where Congress does
not have the power to provide a substantive rule of decision
but where federal jurisdiction would be desirable and constitu-
tional. Mishkin questioned Congress' power to provide a rule
of decision for all cases involving the Bank of the United
174. 80 U.S. at 144-48.
175. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 3, at 590.
176. HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 315-16.
177. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 3, at 590; Note, The Theory of Protective
Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 960, wherein the author states:
One's initial reaction to the half-loaf argument [the greater power
argument] might be to wonder whether it is entirely clear which is the greater
step and which is the lesser. State law grows and evolves in the state courts, a
process frozen when state rules are enforced by federal courts. Whether the
imposition of a federal rule, a rule amenable to growth and interpretation in
the federal courts, is a greater intrusion upon principles of federalism and
legal evolution than the freezing of state rules seems a debatable question,
certainly a question incapable of resolution in the abstract.
178. Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 961-62.
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States as well as for Lathrop, Beeler, and Schumacher.1 79 But
he argued that Congress should be able to provide for jurisdic-
tion in such cases, even if it could not enact a substantive rule
to govern the case. Given the broad powers that the Court has
found Congress possesses under the commerce clause 18 0 and
other article I grants of power, it is doubtful that Mishkin's
objection still has any meaningful relevance."8' Even Wechsler
realized, in 1948, that the power to provide a federal rule of
decision was necessarily broad. He stated: "Needless to say,
Congress has not meant to grant the district courts a general
jurisdiction in every case involving the jurisdictional amount in
which it could confer judicial power under any of the sources
of authority . . . . There is hardly any limit to the cases it
would draw today."'8 2  Thus, Wechsler apparently did not
believe that the requirement of "substantive" power should
unduly hamper Congress.183 However, it is possible to slightly
restate Wechsler's theory in a way that avoids the problems
of "substantive" power and the greater/lesser power
conundrum.18 4
3. The Wechsler Variant
A variant of Wechsler's theory would allow protective
jurisdiction whenever Congress acted pursuant to a valid arti-
cle I power and there was a rational reason to believe that
179. Mishkin states:
Though under current law it seems fairly clear that Congress might legislate
as to most legal relations of an entity created and organized as the Bank was,
it is far from certain even today that federal law could be made substantively
to govern every one of the Bank's lawsuits. Similarly, while it is questionable
whether Congress could provide the substantive rule to govern all obligations
owed to a person who subsequently becomes bankrupt, it is nonetheless clear
that suits by a bankruptcy trustee to recover on such obligations may be
brought by Congress within the jurisdiction of any federal court ....
Mishkin, supra note 3, at 189 (footnotes omitted).
180. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(Congress acted within its constitutional powers when it applied the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to local businesses, such as motels).
181. Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 954.
182. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 225.
183. Mr. Rosenberg cites another objection to Wechsler's theory of protective
jurisdiction. He distinguishes between substantive-based jurisdiction, in which
Congress provides a rule for decision, and forum-based jurisdiction, in which Congress
chooses a forum for reasons other than substance. He argues that Wechsler's focus on
substantive power ignores Congress' power to provide forum-based jurisdiction. Note,
The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 960-61.
184. Id. at 963-64.
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Congress felt federal jurisdiction was a "necessary and
proper"'185 way to effectuate that article I power. Put differ-
ently, protective jurisdiction is constitutional whenever there is
a rational relationship between the means Congress chooses,
protective jurisdiction, and some valid national interest within
Congress' article I power. Admittedly, this would not be an
unduly strict standard of review; it is basically a "necessary
and proper" standard of review. 186 Nor should it be unduly
strict for the same reasons that courts do not aggressively
police congressional regulatory statutes enacted pursuant to
the commerce clause.
The "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction is constitutional
under this variant statement of Wechsler's protective jurisdic-
tion theory. Under article I, section 8, clause 4 of the Constitu-
tion, Congress has power to create uniform rules of
bankruptcy. Federal jurisdiction over "related to" cases is a"necessary and proper" means to effectuate the federal inter-
est in an efficient bankruptcy system, because it can avoid
potential state court bias as well as any potential delays that
may occur in state court.
The main argument against the Wechsler variant, as Pro-
fessor Goldberg-Ambrose has pointed out, relies on a negative
inference that arises from the existence of constitutional diver-
sity jurisdiction. The inference is that the diversity clause
exhausts Congress' power to protect certain domestic litigants
from state forums.18 7 As Goldberg-Ambrose states: "If a case
is similar to a diversity clause case, but does not qualify for
diversity jurisdiction, then the Framers must have intended, as
a negative purpose, that the case does not come into federal
court through the backdoor of the arising under. clause.""'
Frankfurter articulated precisely this argument in his Lincoln
185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819).
186. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); cf. Note, The
Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 958.
187. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 3, at 587. Therein the author states:
The principal argument against interpreting article III to allow a case to arise
under federal law when the only federal law in the plaintiff's claim is the
jurisdictional statute itself is that this interpretation would contravene
negative implications of the diversity clause. If a case is similar to a diversity
clause case, but does not qualify for diversity jurisdiction, then the Framers
must have intended, as a negative purpose, that the case not come into the
federal court through the backdoor of the arising under clause.
188. Id.
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Mills dissent. 89 Goldberg-Ambrose effectively refutes this
argument by noting that protective jurisdiction may further an
important federal policy and not just protect citizens from
bias. 9 ° Likewise, the negative purpose argument fails to give
effect to the possibility that prejudice can take the form of bias
against a federal program or status, not merely bias against
residents of other states.
If article III limits Congress' power to take account of bias
against a federal program by providing jurisdiction without
also enacting a rule of decision, Congress' hands are unduly
tied. The very existence of the article III diversity clause sig-
nals that our forefathers were aware of the possibility of state
court prejudice. The diversity heading was an explicit attempt
to deal with one type of prejudice or bias. It recognizes a
potential problem in a single area, but it does not limit Con-
gress' power to cure other biases. For instance, in the bank-
ruptcy context one can easily imagine a potential bias against
debtors; recall Justice Bradley's worry about "embarrass-
ments" in state court. Any bias that adversely affects the
plaintiff's ability to recover adversely affects federal bank-
ruptcy policies because it might hamper reorganization or
lessen creditor recoveries in a liquidation. If such bias might
possibly exist, is Congress without power to provide a forum?
As Mishkin argued, there may be institutional considerations
that make the federal judges' and jurors' perspectives different
from those of their state counterparts.' 9'
Some may view the last paragraph's bias discussion as far-
fetched in modern day America. However, there are reasons
other than state court bias against bankrupts or federal policy
that might force Congress to provide for a federal forum in
"related to" bankruptcy cases. A reorganization is often a tick-
lish proceeding with ongoing negotiations between the debtor
and the various classes of creditors, as well as among the credi-
tors themselves. In this context, speedy realization of other
claims can only facilitate ultimate resolution of the entire pro-
ceeding. Settlements of claims, approval of plans, and other
critical activity may be delayed pending state court determina-
tion of "related to" claims the debtor may have against third
189. 353 U.S. at 475 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
190. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 3, at 587.
191. Mishkin, supra note 3, at 157-60.
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parties. However, a federal court, in setting its own calendar,
might more successfully avoid this delay.
4. Mishkin's Articulated and Active Policy Requirement
Although Professor Mishkin understood the desirability of
protective jurisdiction statutes in certain contexts, he echoed
some of the concerns noted above regarding article III limits
on Congress' power to create federal jurisdiction in non-diver-
sity "state law" cases. 92 Mishkin worried that Wechsler's
statement of the law (presumably the Wechsler variant as
well) "would give Congress virtually limitless power to chan-
nel to the federal courts controversies between co-citizens gov-
erned wholly by state law on the basis of some remote
connection with an unexpressed federal interest."'93 Instead,
he would uphold protective jurisdiction wherever Congress
granted it pursuant to "an articulated and active federal policy
regulating a field.' 1 94 He synthesizes the requirement from his
reading of the cases, including Osborn, as well as his partial
acceptance of the diversity jurisdiction/negative purpose posi-
tion. His test is intellectually unsatisfactory for several
independent reasons.
A student commentator, Scott Rosenberg, points out that
requiring an "articulated and active" federal policy strains the
language of both articles I and III.' Rosenberg also argues
that Mishkin's "plan" requirement is underinclusive. 98 He
persuasively posits that Congress may desire a federal forum to
capitalize on federal procedures or prevent local bias in
areas 97 where there is no federal plan-9 and that to require a
plan unduly limits congressional choice.
Moreover, how does a court determine if a plan is "articu-
lated and active," and what test does it use? Is the existence of
a plan a legislative fact on which Congress is entitled to great
deference, or is it something the court should determine on its
own? Although we are stuck with many tests that sound
unworkable' 99 there does not seem to be any reason to add
192. Id. at 190.
193. HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 417.
194. Mishkin, supra note 3, at 192.
195. Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 962.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 949-50.
198. Id. at 962-63.
199. See, e.g., Jacobellius v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
[Vol. 11:1
"Related To" Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
another, especially when to do so requires a court to determine
if Congress has done enough to justify doing less. Mishkin's
theory is an ironic twist on Wechsler's greater power/lesser
power axiom. Mishkin's plan requirement is arguably unwork-
able, and unduly limits desirable congressional leeway in
choosing among alternative means of regulation. Rosenberg
notes, however, that the "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction is
constitutional under Mishkin's test. There is an "active and
articulated" federal bankruptcy program. Thus, the jurisdic-
tional statute is a reasonable part of that program and not a"naked grant of federal jurisdiction. 200
But given the problems with Jackson's test and Mishkin's
federal "plan" requirement, one still may wonder whether the
Wechsler variant (as well as the quoted Wechsler justification)
goes too far. As Professor Currie said: "To say that a case
arises under federal law whenever a federal statute gives juris-
diction is to destroy all limitations on federal jurisdiction. "201
In particular, the Wechsler variant might allow protective
jurisdiction statutes that affect the state's ability to control the
interpretation and development of state law. That erosion
might arguably undermine the state's place in our federal
system.
5. Protective Jurisdiction Justifications That Emphasize
"States' Rights"
Two commentators have responded to the concern for
states' rights with proposed limits on Congress' power to grant
protective jurisdiction to federal courts. Rosenberg argues that
"the structure of article III and a basic assumption about the
distribution of federal and state judicial power require more
exacting scrutiny of protective jurisdiction than a necessary
and proper standard of deference. "202 First, he would require
what he calls an actual forum-based interest in jurisdiction,
defined as an interest in federal procedures, uniform proce-
dures, or avoidance of allegedly biased state tribunals. 203 Sec-
ond, he would require that the forum-based interest be
substantial, and finally, that the protective jurisdiction Con-
(in reference to a proposed "hard-core pornography" test in First Amendment cases
Justice Stewart said: "I know it when I see it.").
200. HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 417.
201. D. CURRIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 103 (1981).
202. Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 964.
203. Id. at 949-50.
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gress granted be no broader than that warranted by the forum-
based interest.20 4
Professor Goldberg-Ambrose has expressed concerns with
the states' ability to articulate and interpret state law in the
light of protective jurisdiction statutes. She contends that any
justification for protective jurisdiction must examine "the
nature of the consequent encroachments on state auton-
omy."2 °5  Relying in part on the tenth amendment,20 6 she
prescribes an approach to protective jurisdiction that balances
the states' interests "that bear on the state citizens' ability
effectively to control and hold accountable the officers of state
government" 20 7 against the "federal government's interest ...
in effectuating national policy by manipulating the states in
some specified way, rather than acting directly on the popu-
lace."2 Goldberg-Ambrose sees the state's interest as preserv-
ing a relationship between itself and its citizens. State citizens
should control state government through the state representa-
tive process, and Congress should not have the power to
destroy that relationship, through protective jurisdiction or
otherwise. As long as state citizens can hold state officers
accountable through the election process, that relationship is
preserved. But when federal law forces state officers to per-
form unpopular tasks, the electorate is often confused, and
ousts state officers who were acting pursuant to federal edict
rather than in their own stead. Ostensibly, this process under-
mines state autonomy and notions of political accountability.20 9
Additionally, Professor Goldberg-Ambrose claims that
when federal judges are ordered to interpret and apply state
statutes, interpret state common law, and review state adminis-
trative agency decisions, federal judges deny state citizens the
opportunity to influence such decisions through the direct or
indirect selection of state court judges.210
However true her concerns might be when federal actors
204. Id. at 959; see also id. at 954-59.
205. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 3, at 593-95.
206. The tenth amendment provides:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
207. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 3, at 609.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 595-601.
210. Id. at 604.
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force state agents to act, as in school desegregation cases or
environmental matters,21 1 one must wonder how apt they are
when protective jurisdiction is involved. In a school desegrega-
tion battle, federal judges (or administrators) may oversee
local school board officials and force them to act in conform-
ance with federal requirements that are contrary to local posi-
tions on the matter-and to act in ways different from what
the school board members would do absent federal compulsion.
However, in the protective jurisdiction context, a federal judge
is ordered to interpret and follow state law. The compulsion
exerted is not on local officials, but on other federal officials-
the federal judges. It is very similar to what happens in a
diversity case, when at congressional direction a federal judge
follows and applies state law.
There is a distinction between requiring a state officer to
somehow act and allowing a federal judge to interpret state
law in a case where state decisions are binding. There seems to
be little real risk that state judges will be held accountable for
federal judges' decisions in cases involving state law. The like-
lihood of confusion regarding state judicial accountability
seems much greater when state judges hear cases involving
federal law and must apply federal law no matter what their
own views. In such cases state judges are making decisions
that federal law mandates, and the potential for confusion
among state voters seems great. Despite this potential, Profes-
sor Goldberg-Ambrose does not call for repeal of the
supremacy clause.
Moreover, she admits that diversity jurisdiction and pen-
dent and ancillary jurisdiction have not adversely affected
state citizens' rights to influence the development of state
law,21 2 because diversity jurisdiction and pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction do not entail the "systematic displacement of state
courts. '2 13 But she argues that protective jurisdiction can lead
to an alteration of the "texture of state policy," jeopardizing
"the participatory rights of state citizens in state govern-
ment." '214 This could occur when protective jurisdiction is
exclusive over a certain type of case, or when plaintiffs per-
ceive a federal forum as so advantageous that its availability
211. Id. at 601-04.
212. Id. at 608.
213. Id. at 607.
214. Id. at 608.
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will lead to plaintiffs filing all such cases in federal court.215
However, as will be discussed below, the political process
makes the enactment of protective jurisdiction statutes that
totally displace state courts highly unlikely.
Finally, what both commentators' tests lack is the type of
persuasive simplicity one strives for in interpreting documents
like the Constitution. Rosenberg requires a substantial forum-
based interest, but offers no guidance as to what is substantial.
Likewise, he requires that the federal jurisdictional grant be
no broader than absolutely necessary to further the forum-
based interest, but does not explain how a court would ade-
quately make that determination. Goldberg-Ambrose asks the
court to engage in a balancing process, presumably after mak-
ing sure it has isolated the relevant interests. However, she
does not explain how the court should isolate those interests,
nor does she say what weight the court should give to each
interest in the balance. Although the authors of these tests
may counter that courts deal with these questions in constitu-
tional litigation all the time in areas such as equal protection,
due process, and the first amendment, those cases all involve
individual rights. Protective jurisdiction, however, involves the
allocation of power between federal and state governments. In
this area, the courts generally defer to Congress after minimal
review and rely upon the political process as the primary check
on congressional action. Is there any reason not to defer if pro-
tective jurisdiction is involved? Is there any justification for
heightened scrutiny of a grant of protective jurisdiction as
opposed to a congressional regulation of interstate commerce?
Arguably not, and constitutional developments since these
commentators wrote undermine the bases of their stricter
scrutiny requirements.
B. Garcia Refutes States' Rights Limits
on Protective Jurisdiction
Both Rosenberg and Goldberg-Ambrose wrote after
National League of Cities v. Usery216 and before Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.217 In Usery, a major-
ity of the Supreme Court held that Congress could not extend
the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair
215. Id.
216. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
217. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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Labor Standards Act2 18 to the states and their various subdivi-
sions because to do so would exceed congressional power under
the commerce clause. Justice Rehnquist, in his plurality opin-
ion, was especially concerned with recognizing and protecting
"the essential role of the States in our federal system of gov-
ernment."21 9 He looked to the tenth amendment as a shield
for the states from federal power, reasoning that Congress
went too far when its legislation affected the states qua states
in areas of traditional state competence. He said: "We hold
that insofar as the challenged amendments [to the FLSA] oper-
ate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure inte-
gral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions,
they are not within the authority granted Congress by Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3."220
In dissent, Justice Brennan criticized Rehnquist's test as
unworkable, and argued that Congress, pursuant to the com-
merce clause, did have the requisite power to pass the chal-
lenged legislation. He saw no restraint on that power "based
on state sovereignty ... expressed in the Constitution [or the
Court's] ... decisions over the last century and a half." '221 Fur-
ther, Brennan argued that any check on congressional power
in this area must come from the political arena.2 2 2 As he
noted, "Judicial restraint in this area merely recognizes that
the political branches of our Government are structured to
protect the interests of the States, as well as the Nation as a
whole, and that the States are fully able to protect their own
interests .... ,,22' How so? In reliance on Wechsler's seminal
piece The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Gov-
ernment,224 Brennan reasoned that the states elected both rep-
218. Federal Labor Standards Act of 1983, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
(1982).
219. 426 U.S. at 844.
220. Id. at 852. There is some confusion in Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion.
The portion quoted in the text would indicate that Congress exceeded its power in
enacting the statute. In two other instances, however, Rehnquist presents an
alternative analysis which posits that the amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act were within Congress' power under article I, but that the tenth amendment served
as an affirmative limitation on that power. Id. at 841, 845. This seems to be the
appropriate analytic framework (even if one does disagree with it) and the quoted
portion in the text should be viewed as merely a slight misstatement of that approach.
221. Id. at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 872 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
224. 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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resentatives and senators. Thus the decisions of the national
legislature are the decisions of the states themselves. The polls
serve as the check on any federal legislation that unduly oblit-
erates state sovereignty. To Brennan, judicial intervention on
grounds of protecting state sovereignty upset, rather than pro-
tected, the political system that defines "our Federalism. 225
He noted: "Judicial redistribution of powers granted the
National Government by the terms of the Constitution violates
the fundamental tenet of our federalism that the extent of fed-
eral intervention into the States' affairs in the exercise of dele-
gated powers shall be determined by the States' exercise of
political power through their representatives in Congress. 226
Despite his eloquence, Brennan wrote for a minority; however,
less than ten years later, that minority became a majority in
what may be called a rapid turn of events.
In Garcia, the Court reconsidered and overruled Usery in
another Fair Labor Standards Act case. Justice Blackmun,
who had concurred in the Usery result, wrote for a majority of
five.227 The case involved the applicability of the FLSA to a
municipally owned mass-transit system. The lower court had
held that ownership of a mass transit system was a traditional
governmental function, and thus under Usery was immune
from regulation.22' Rather than dawdle over the definition of a
traditional governmental function, the Court overruled Usery.
Blackmun first concluded that the Usery test of what was
and what was not a traditional governmental function was
unworkable. 229 Then, examining the structure of our national
government, he concluded that "the principal means chosen by
the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal sys-
tem lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself. 230
Echoing Wechsler's thesis on political power he continued:
"State sovereignty interests, then, are more properly protected
225. 426 U.S. at 877-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
226. Id.
227. 469 U.S. at 530.
228. Id. at 533-36. Actually, the district court originally concluded that ownership
of a local mass transit system was an integral operation in an area of traditional
governmental function under Usery. While the case was on appeal, the Supreme
Court decided Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982), in
which it concluded that ownership of a commuter railway service was not a traditional
governmental function. Therefore, the Court remanded Garcia. On remand, the
district court adhered to its original view and another appeal ensued.
229. Id. at 546-47.
230. Id. at 550.
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by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the fed-
eral government than by judicially created limitations on fed-
eral power."2 3 ' Thus the Supreme Court laid Usery to rest.232
It is not difficult to imagine how more stringent tests for
judicial review of protective jurisdiction might appear during a
period when Usery was the law of the land. If the wages and
hours that a state pays its employees is a forbidden subject for
Congress to address, it is not a far leap to conclude that state
development of state law is also a subject of traditional state
competence. If that is so, then perhaps one might conclude
that all protective jurisdiction statutes are an unconstitutional
federal usurpation of state sovereignty.
But in light of Garcia, protective jurisdiction tests that are
stricter than those applied in other areas of federal regulation
seem anomalous. It is certainly true that protective jurisdic-
tion legislation affects state courts and that the regulatory leg-
islation at issue in commerce clause cases generally affects
state legislatures and executives. But frequently, commerce
clause legislation provides substantive standards for the courts
to apply, as do the antitrust laws and the civil rights laws.
Moreover, statutes frequently provide for federal jurisdiction
that partially or totally displaces state courts in certain areas.
More basically, why should judicial review of laws that
affect the state judiciary be more exacting than those affecting
state legislatures and executives? Political controls should
work just as effectively in one area as in another. Is article III
somehow a more meaningful control on Congress' power to act
vis-a-vis the state judiciary than the tenth amendment is on
Congress' power to act vis-a-vis state executives and legisla-
tors? Nothing is immediately apparent to support such a dis-
tinction. In both cases, the basic question is the allocation of
power between state and federal governments in areas that do
not adversely affect individual rights.
231. Id. at 552.
232. Interestingly, the House has voted down a post-Garcia recommendation from
the A.B.A. Section of Urban, State, and Local Government Law for the three branches
of the federal government to exercise "restraint and discretion" in adopting laws and
regulations that affect state and local governments. 56 U.S.L.W. 2098 (Aug. 18, 1987).
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1. The Political Process Is the Primary Check on Federal
Jurisdiction Including Federal Protective
Jurisdiction
Our forefathers intended that the federal courts should
have co-extensive competence with the federal legislature.233
Given the breadth of that purpose and the breadth with which
the Supreme Court has interpreted the necessary and proper
clause,234 stricter scrutiny of protective jurisdiction legislation
seems unduly narrow and inappropriate. But some may con-
tend that certain of our forefathers were wary of federal
courts, and certainly would have objected to protective jurisdic-
tion as an undue impairment of state sovereignty. No doubt
this is true, but there are always problems with determining
the forefathers' intent. What should we look at-the drafters'
writings, the debates at the constitutional convention,
Madison's notes, the ratification debates, The Federalist
Papers?235  Moreover, if we could interview all involved we
could probably find a few who would not object to protective
jurisdiction.
Another more basic problem exists-things change. If we
wanted to shock our forefathers we could show them cases like
Wickard v. Fillburn,2 36 Heart of Atlanta Motel,23 or even Gar-
cia. Surely many of them had no conception that congressional
power would grow to the extent that it has in particular cases.
Does that mean that Congress lacks the power to deal with
national emergencies, like race discrimination and depression,
that never occurred to our forefathers? Congress should have
the power to provide for federal jurisdiction but not a federal
rule of decision if doing so reasonably furthers a national
interest.
Some may object that the Wechsler variant of protective
jurisdiction makes article III a dead letter, an unnecessary
addendum.2 38 As Rosenberg states, reading "arising under" to
233. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824);
THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. HAMILTON); HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at
25; Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question", 16 TUL. L. REV. 362, 364-67 (1942);
Forrester, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Labor Disputes, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 114, 118-19 (1948).
234. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
235. A. HAMILTON, J. JAY, J. MADISON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (C. Rossiter ed.
1961).
236. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
237. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
238. See Note. The Theoru of Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 956 ("With a
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include protective jurisdiction (under the Wechsler variant)
makes the other ten headings unnecessary, which would be a
disfavored interpretation.239 There are several responses. One
is that article III can be read as providing a broad heading of
jurisdiction-"arising under"-followed by ten more specific
headings. More basically, canons of interpretation must not
override the principal notion that, after all, it is a constitution
we are interpreting.24 °
Blind adherence to Rosenberg's canon would question the
results in many leading cases on federal legislative power,
especially commerce clause cases. Arguably, since the thirties,
and at least since 1964, it seems apparent that given the Court's
interpretation of the commerce clause (and the necessary and
proper clause), there is probably no need for any other affirm-
ative grant of power. Congress could justify a bankruptcy act
under the commerce clause without resorting to congressional
power to make uniform rules of bankruptcy.2 41 Congress could
monitor the currency under its commerce power without
resorting to its power to coin money.242 Does that make Wick-
ard, Heart of Atlanta, and cases like them wrong? Likewise, is
the same argument not applicable to the tenth amendment
itself?24 3 Does Rosenberg's canon of interpretation not force us
to overrule Garcia?
By looking at the federal court structure provided, one
should determine whether the forefathers really meant for the
political processes to control the federal judiciary and whether
the political controls that Wechsler articulated,244 and that the
little imagination, therefore, the arising-under clause could be made to swallow the
remaining jurisdictional grants. It is difficult to imagine, of course, why the Framerswould have enumerated eleven jurisdictional clauses were the arising-under clause
alone meant to be flexible enough to do the work of all.").
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
242. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
243. In United States v. Fry, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975), the Court said the
following about the tenth amendment:
While the tenth amendment has been characterized as a "truism," stating
merely that "all is retained which has not been surrendered," United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), it is not without significance. The
Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their
ability to function effectively in a federal system.
244. See also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 866 (1976) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 171-259 (1980).
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Garcia majority relied upon, really do control federal power.
Our forefathers intended that the political process should
serve as the principal check on the scope of the federal judicial
power, just as they intended political controls to govern the
exercise of federal legislative power in other areas.245 All of
those present at the constitutional convention desired a
national judiciary.246 No one questioned the need for a
Supreme Court.24' But when the subject of lower federal
courts arose, debate ensued both in the convention and later in
the ratification process.2 48 The solution reached in the conven-
tion, and accepted during the ratification proceedings, was to
give Congress the power to create lower federal courts but not
to require their creation.249 As Madison noted: "there [is] a
distinction between establishing such tribunals absolutely, and
giving a discretion to the Legislature to establish or not estab-
lish them."2 ° Madison felt the convention was doing the lat-
ter. Hart and Wechsler interpret the compromise that created
article III to mean that Congress not only has discretion to cre-
ate or not create federal courts, but a discretion to give juris-
diction or take it away.251 They state: "And it seems to be a
necessary inference from the express decision that the creation
of inferior federal courts was to rest in the discretion of Con-
gress that the scope of their jurisdiction, once created, was also
to be discretionary. '25 2 Congress could create lower federal
245. See supra text accompanying notes 216-31.
246. HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 4.
247. Id. at 11.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 11-12.
251. Cf. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1815); 1 GOEBEL,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND
BEGINNINGS TO 1801 240, 241-43, 246-47 n.228 (1971), criticized in HART & WECHSLER
(2d ed.), supra note 3, at 12-13 n.46. See also supra note 30.
252. HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 12.
[T]he plan of the Constitution for the courts-was quite simply that the
Congress would decide from time to time how far the federal judicial
institution should be used within the limits of the federal judicial power; or,
stated differently, how far judicial jurisdiction should be left to the state
courts, bound as they are by the Constitution as "the Supreme Law of the
Land. . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."
Id. at 363 (quoting Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
1001, 1005-1006 (1965)). Accord Sheldon v. Sell, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850) (Congress
has a similar power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court's original and appellate
jurisdiction). See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); HART & WECHS-
LER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 330-60, 363.
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courts or not create them. It could create them and then do
away with them. It could give jurisdiction or not give it. It
could give some jurisdiction but not other jurisdiction. It could
give jurisdiction and then take it away. It was Congress that
would control the lower federal courts and it was the political
process that would control Congress. The primary check on
congressional power over the lower federal courts is the polit-
ical control the citizenry exercises over its federal representa-
tives. 2 3 That process, then, should be the ultimate check on
protective jurisdiction statutes.
This discussion certainly does not establish explicit author-
ity for the proposition that Congress may grant the federal
courts protective jurisdiction over certain cases, but it does
show that the Framers anticipated that the political process
would be the primary check on Congress' decisions regarding
the federal judiciary. That is the same political process that
operates to check the federal legislature when it acts in other
areas, as in Garcia. Thus, why should we have two different
tests? We are not dealing here with legislation affecting a
group that is unable to protect itself in the political arena.254
Protective jurisdiction deals with the allocation of power
among the federal and state governments. As long as Congress
is validly exercising an article I power and its means are
rationally related to its ends, the means are constitutional.
Surely a protective jurisdiction statute that Congress enacts
pursuant to a valid article I power could be a "necessary and
proper" way to further a proper legislative end.
Moreover, congressional discretion over federal jurisdic-
tion makes the existence of protective jurisdiction more palat-
able to those who fear for the states' autonomy. The discretion
to create federal protective jurisdiction goes hand-in-hand with
congressional power to take jurisdiction away or even to
destroy the federal courts altogether. Thus, while one Con-
gress may enact wide-ranging protective jurisdiction statutes
and otherwise broaden federal jurisdiction, another may cut
253. Although Congress almost immediately created lower federal courts, it did
not convey general original jurisdiction over federal question cases until 1875. HART &
WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 32-33, 846-47. The fact that Congress did not
exercise its power until then does not mean it did not exist. Congress simply chose not
to exercise it. Moreover, Congress has frequently throughout our history granted
federal courts jurisdiction over particular controversies. Id. at 844-45. Osborn is an
example of such jurisdiction.
254. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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back on federal jurisdiction and eliminate certain jurisdictional
headings altogether. That neither event is likely to violently
occur or even occur with regularity is testament to the fact
that the political process may very well serve as a check on
Congress' discretion to grant, deny, or remove federal jurisdic-
tion. Likewise, as in any area, judicial deference minimizes
undue interference with legislative programs.
Still, some may allege that protective jurisdiction is differ-
ent from regulatory legislation because article III provides
some kind of limit that is not present in the regulatory con-
text. But what about the tenth amendment as a check on con-
gressional authority in other regulatory matters? Why is it
less of a shield from federal power than article III?2"5 Without
getting into a comparison of what may well be apples and
oranges, it is respectfully submitted that article III does, as
Wechsler implicitly noted and as the variant statement of his
theory recognizes, impose certain limits. First, Congress must
be acting within the broad range of its article I powers. Sec-
ond, jurisdiction must be a rational and/or necessary and
proper means of furthering the article I federal interest that
Congress is pursuing. And third, the jurisdiction must be over
a case or controversy. That is, Congress cannot ask a federal
court to do that which is not by nature judicial business.
Although one may question just what it is that makes a case or
controversy,25 6 few doubt that it is still a requirement, and
neither the Wechsler justification for protective jurisdiction
nor the Wechsler variant question the requirement.
Finally, article III serves as that portion of the federal con-
stitution that provides for the existence of federal courts. As
article I provides for the legislative branch and article II pro-
vides for the executive branch, article III provides for the judi-
cial branch. In this light, one may view it as the airfield
without which the congressional creation of lower courts or
grants of jurisdiction could not land.
Greater intellects than mine have pondered the question
of whether our political processes adequately monitor federal
intrusions on state sovereignty.257 Precise answers underesti-
255. See generally supra note 3.
256. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 3, at 64-241; A. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives
on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979).
257. See the authorities discussed and cited in Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 3, at
595-98.
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mate the difficult nature of the question and any answers at all
may be impossible at a level greater than conjecture or intui-
tion. But it is the law of the land, as articulated in Garcia, that
the political process is an adequate check on congressional
power when states' rights are involved and the history of pro-
tective jurisdiction shows that the political process has worked
to check congressional discretion at least in that one area.
Congress has never exercised all its power in this regard. It
has never passed a statute providing for federal jurisdiction
over all contract cases affecting interstate commerce.258 Would
such a statute be constitutional? Under the arguments
asserted herein, it probably would. It would be a valid exercise
of Congress' article I power over interstate commerce and no
doubt would be rationally related to solving some national
problem. But in two hundred years, Congress has never passed
such an act.
Other wide ranging, as well as certain narrow, proposals
for protective jurisdiction have also failed.259 Although con-
gressional debate frequently centers around the constitutional-
ity of such provisions, it is clear that the political process
serves as a check on unbridled protective jurisdiction statutes.
The "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction contained in the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
exemplifies just how those political processes can work to
check federal expansion. It is a finely tailored accommodation
of state and federal interests.
VII. THE "RELATED To" BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
EXEMPLIFIES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS
AS A CHECK ON CONGRESSIONAL INTRUSIONS ON AND
USURPATION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH PROTECTIVE
JURISDICTION STATUTES
Obviously, Congress saw a need for the "related to" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction. One of those needs, as articulated in the
legislative history for the 1978 Act, was to do away with unnec-
essary litigation over bankruptcy court jurisdiction.2 60 Another
need was to provide one court for all proceedings even tangen-
tially related to bankruptcy in order to speed the bankruptcy
258. Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 3, at 954-57.
259. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 3, at 542-45.
260. See generally supra note 3.
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process.2 61 The first goal did not survive the post-Marathon
restructuring. With the core versus non-core distinctions, clas-
sification litigation promises to once again reach epidemic pro-
portions.262 As for the second goal, under the 1984 Act all
litigation "related to" bankruptcy will not be in one federal
court. That is because the political process, solicitous of state
courts and their place in the federal system, adopted a system
that minimizes federal intrusions into state law matters
between non-diverse parties yet preserves the federal interest
in efficient bankruptcies.
This restructuring involved the use of the mandatory and
discretionary abstention statutes discussed earlier in section
11.263 Under the mandatory abstention statute, the federal
courts must defer to a state court in a "related to" proceeding
if a timely adjudication can occur in a matter where federal
jurisdiction exists only because of the "related to" bankruptcy
statute.264 The statute manifests an obvious congressional con-
cern with the efficient administration of the federal bank-
ruptcy system, but at the same time Congress has shown a
willingness to defer to the state courts. Earlier it was noted
that several reasons may justify protective jurisdiction, includ-
261. Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Court Under the New Bankruptcy Law: Its
Structure and Jurisdiction, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63 (1981).
The division of jurisdiction in the judicial business arising out of or
related to cases commenced under the Bankruptcy Act has had deplorable
effects on bankruptcy administration. The necessity of litigating some
controversies that arise out of a bankruptcy case in a nonbankruptcy court is
productive of delay. Dockets of nonbankruptcy courts are likely to be more
crowded than those of bankruptcy courts, and the pace of nonbankruptcy
litigation is likely to be slower than that of bankruptcy courts. Delay is likely
to be particularly prejudicial in reorganization cases, but even in liquidation
cases, delay is practically certain to aggravate the deterioration of asset values
that is a concommitant of bankruptcy.
Id. at 85.
262. One need only look at the annotations to 28 U.S.C. § 157 to see the bulk of
classification litigation that is occurring under that section.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44. For a good discussion breaking
down the mandatory abstention statute into a six-step test, see In re Texaco, Inc., 77
Bankr. 433 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also In re David Turner, 70 Bankr. 486 (Bankr.
D. Mont. 1987).
264. See, e.g., National Acceptance Co. of California v. Levin, 75 Bankr. 457 (D.
Ariz. 1987); In re Consulting Actuarial Partners Ltd. Partnership, 72 Bankr. 821
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re P & P Oilfield Equipment, Inc., 71 Bankr. 621, 623-24 (D.
Colo. 1987) ("Put simply, this matter should not be in this Court. It is not a 'core'
proceeding; it concerns only questions of State law, and would have never come before
me absent P & P's bankruptcy. As such, I abstain from hearing the instant case and
hope that this opinion will send an unforgettable message to the bankruptcy bar of the
district for future reference.").
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ing preferable federal procedures, local bias,265 or early federal
trial dates. Here there is no indication that federal procedures
are preferable. Likewise, it seems clear from Congress' will-
ingness to force abstention that local bias is not at the root of
the "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction. Although local bias
could justify protective jurisdiction, it seems Congress' motiva-
tion in creating the "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction was
faster federal trials. Trial in the "quickest" forum would
result in a more efficient bankruptcy system, including early
reorganization resolution and faster liquidations. 6 Achieving
these ends can only help the national economy.
Moreover, one of the purposes of bankruptcy is to provide
the bankruptcy debtor with a fresh start.26 7 Congress intended
to free the debtor from most of his or her debts so he or she
could start anew. Obviously, the quicker the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding is resolved, the sooner the debtor can begin again. All
of these beneficial goals justify Congress' desire to resolve
bankruptcies quickly. But if state trials of cases "related to"
bankruptcy can further these ends just as well as federal trials,
then the federal court must abstain. When the trial delays are
equal, the states' interest in interpreting its own laws man-
dates a state forum.
The mandatory abstention provision protects the states'
interests in interpreting and developing state law where those
interests do not conflict with the federal interest in speedy
bankruptcy proceedings. But Congress did not stop with the
mandatory abstention provisions. There is also a discretionary
abstention provision, which allows a federal district court to
abstain in all types of bankruptcy cases in the interests of jus-
tice, comity, or respect for state law.2 8
Thus, even when the statute does not require a federal
court to abstain, it still may. Even when a state adjudication
might delay a bankruptcy, the federal court may still abstain if
the court feels that the state's interests in hearing the case out-
weigh the federal interest in timely resolution of all bank-
ruptcy proceedings.26 9 In essence, the discretionary abstention
265. See supra text accompanying notes 152-54.
266. See supra text accompanying note 191. See also In re Gianakas, 75 Bankr. 272
(N.D. Ill. 1986).
267. 3 L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 525.02 (15th ed. 1985).
268. See supra note 43.
269. As the court said in In re Allegheny, Inc.: "In exercising our discretion, we
must look at what will most reasonably provide for economical and expeditious
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provisions provide for a balancing of federal and state interests
to determine what forum should decide a "related to" case.
This balancing test is somewhat like the one Professor
Goldberg-Ambrose suggests, but the most important difference
is that it is a legislatively-enacted balancing test rather than a
constitutional command. It is evidence that the political pro-
cess does act as a check on Congress' willingness to enact pro-
tective jurisdiction statutes that allegedly usurp state judicial
power.
When might the federal court exercise its discretion to
abstain? Most basically, the court must balance the delay
inherent in discretionary abstention against the state's inter-
administration of this estate." 68 Bankr. 183, 192 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986). Or as the
court said in In re Aristera:
The matters of state law alleged in the Complaint are neither novel nor
complicated and, thus, neither the interest of comity with state courts nor
respect for state law require that this Court abstain. This Court is aware of
the backlog of cases on the El Paso state courts' dockets. If this matter were
referred to the state courts, there would be at least a one-year delay-and
perhaps as much as a three-year delay-before the matter could be heard.
The Bankruptcy Court can take up the matter more quickly. It would be in
the best interests of the parties and other creditors to have these matters
resolved and, if Chaney is indebted to the Debtor, to have the obligation paid
so that the Debtor may proceed with its reorganization without needless
delay.
65 Bankr. 928, 931 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986).
Likewise, the court noted that litigation in the bankruptcy court was just as conve-
nient to the parties as litigation in the state courts. Id. See also In re Mike Burns Inn,
Inc. 70 Bankr. 863, 865 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); In re Earla Industries, Inc., 72 Bankr.
131, 134 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (court would not abstain where claim was small, state
law was settled, and defendant was in another state); Medina-Figueroa v. Heylinger, 63
Bankr. 572, 575 (D.P.R. 1986) (district court would not abstain in malpractice suit
where state court claim had been dismissed and abstention would require the filing of
a new action or an attempt to reopen the old one, which had been closed for over three
years); In re The Bible Speaks, 65 Bankr. 415, 431 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986). Other
courts have stated that abstention may be appropriate where the matter is only tan-
gentially related to the case. Cf. In re Sunwest Distributors, 69 Bankr. 861, 866 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1987); see also In re J.F. Naylor and Co., Inc., 67 Bankr. 192, 194 (Bankr. M.D.
La. 1986).
Alternatively, the court in In re Artic Enterprises, Inc., 68 Bankr. 71, 77-78 (D.
Minn. 1986), said that discretionary abstention was proper where the moving party is
not acting in good faith or where the state court is a more convenient and better suited
forum for the case. It should also be noted that § 1334(c)(3) is not explicitly limited to"related to" cases, and thus a court might abstain in a "core proceeding." See, e.g., In
re Elegant Concepts, Ltd., 61 Bankr. 723, 729 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Pankau, 65
Bankr. 204 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
There is some question whether a state action must be pending to require absten-
tion or whether a federal court must abstain if a state proceeding could be commenced
and concluded before a federal proceeding could be concluded, even though a state
action is not already filed. See supra note 44. If Congress were truly concerned with
balancing state and federal interests, the latter interpretation would seem most logical.
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ests in interpreting and developing state law. The greater the
delay, and more specifically, the greater the likelihood that
delay will have an adverse effect on the bankruptcy proceed-
ing, the greater the state's interests must be. One can imagine
that the federal interest in resolving reorganizations may mean
that discretionary abstention is less appropriate in a reorgani-
zation case where plans must be approved and ongoing negotia-
tions are common than it would be in a liquidation. °
Most prominently, cases where the state law on a given
point is unsettled are likely candidates for discretionary
abstention . 2 1 For instance, where a claim involves a novel
question or an issue on which state court decisions are split or
are unduly confusing, abstention is justified.2  In these cases,
the state courts are the appropriate courts to develop the
state's laws, and abstention allows them to do that. In this
regard abstention operates much like a state certification pro-
cedure, except that the federal court passes off the entire case
and not just one issue.
Alternatively, abstention might be appropriate where the
state recognizes the right to jury trial and a jury is demanded.
Given that the right to jury trial in bankruptcy court is unset-
tled273 and that there may be institutional differences between
270. In abstaining in In re World Financial Services Center, Inc., 64 Bankr. 980,
990 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986), the court noted the following: "Additionally, this case has
been converted to a Chapter 7 case and there is not the administrative urgency
typically found in a Chapter 11 case. There is no reorganization effort being
contemplated and as such, no pending plan."
271. See, e.g., In re Allegheny, Inc., 68 Bankr. 183, 192 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.. 1986); In
re World Financial Services Center, Inc., 64 Bankr. 980, 989 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1986); In
re Finley, 62 Bankr. 361 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986); In re Double TRL, Inc., 65 Bankr. 993,
1002 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986). It should be noted that there appears to be somewhat of
a conflict regarding the authority to abstain. The abstention provisions explicitly refer
to the district court's authority to abstain. Thus there is a question whether or not the
bankruptcy court itself may abstain. At least one court has held that it has that
authority. In re Allied Mechanical and Plumbing Corporation, 62 Bankr. 873, 878
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). Accord In re Double TRL, Inc., 65 Bankr. 993, 1002 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Elegant Concepts, Ltd., 61 Bankr. 723, 727 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1986); In re Baumgartner, 57 Bankr. 517, 520 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986).
Another court has held that the bankruptcy court is authorized only to
recommend abstention. In re Atlas Automation, Inc., 42 Bankr. 246, 249 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1984). See also In re Sturm, 66 Bankr. 325, 329 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); In re
Futura Industries, Inc., 69 Bankr. 831 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
272. Cf. In re Texas Turn-Key Operators, Inc., 70 Bankr. 193 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1986) (where law was settled and abstention might result in two inconsistent state
court determinations the court would not abstain).
273. In In re Wallrich Carpets, Inc., 66 Bankr. 420 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986),
defendant had requested a jury and the case was "wholly governed by state law." Id.
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juries in state and federal court,274 abstention may be appropri-
ate. Finally, the court might abstain where there are no prom-
inent federal or state interests involved but the case is one
which, absent the bankruptcy, would have usually been tried
in a state court. That is, where it is a "coin toss" between state
and federal interests, the state court should be allowed to try
the case. 75
In addition to the abstention provisions, Congress pro-
tected state sovereignty when it made the "related to" bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction concurrent but not exclusive.276 Therefore,
non-diverse debtor plaintiffs can for whatever reason always
choose to sue in state court. Thus, as a result of the abstention
provisions and the concurrent jurisdiction provision, not all
cases "related to" bankruptcy will be litigated in federal
court.277 Likewise, no one area of the law, for example, con-
at 420-21. In rejecting an argument that it should hear the case because the debtor
plaintiff needed money and the bankruptcy court could hear the matter sooner, the
court stated:
This court's ability to resolve promptly the matters which only this court
can decide will be destroyed if it permits its calendar to be clogged by cases
such as this, which are here only because our calendar moves with greater
dispatch.
See also In re Consolidated Lewis Investment Corp.-Ltd. Partnership, 78 Bankr. 469
(Bankr. M.D. La. 1987); In re Wolfe, 68 Bankr. 80, 83 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986) (no
abstention even though jury demanded).
274. See, e.g., Mishkin, supra note 3, at 157-60.
275. See generally In re Drenckhahn, 77 Bankr. 697, 711-12 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1987); In re Harry R. Nantz, 75 Bankr. 617 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987); In re Nanodat
Computer Corp., 74 Bankr. 766 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Studebaker's of Fort
Lauderdale, Ltd., 73 Bankr. 217 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987); In re Cache, Inc., 71 Bankr.
851 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re EPISCAN, Inc., 71 Bankr. 975 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1987).
276. 11 U.S.C. § 303.
277. See, e.g., Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 3, at 595-608. Professor Goldberg-
Ambrose is particularly concerned with the systematic displacement of state courts.
Id. at 607. If state courts are systematically displaced in a given area of litigation, then
the states will allegedly lose control over the interpretation and development of state
law in those areas, and there are grave risks of confusion regarding accountability for
decisions. There are several responses to Professor Goldberg-Ambrose's concerns. One
is that since the forties we have relied (except when Usery was the law) upon the
political process to gauge accountability when questions of state and federal power are
involved. See supra text accompanying notes 202-258. Another is that Congress has
never passed any statute systematically displacing state courts and leaving state law as
the rule of decision. The closest was § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, and the Supreme
Court interpreted that "jurisdictional" statute as authorizing the creation of federal
common law rather than as an expansive category of protective jurisdiction. It is
respectfully submitted that that interpretive approach is appropriate when and if
Congress arguably removes a vast area of law from state courts but is not clear in
doing so. It is clear that the bankruptcy cases do not systematically displace state
courts. See supra text accompanying notes 269-273. More likely, the displacement is
akin to that which occurs in diversity jurisdiction, although probably less, and
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tracts, property, landlord-tenant, is being removed en masse to
federal court. There will not be what Goldberg-Ambrose calls
the "systematic displacement of state courts"278s in certain areas
of the law. Only particular cases involving bankruptcy debtors
will be heard in federal, rather than state, court. Thus, state
courts will continue to control the development of state law
and will remain accountable to the state citizenry. Moreover,
state court decisions will be binding on the federal courts just
as in diversity cases.
The "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction also has another
positive side effect. This discussion of "related to" jurisdiction
has dealt with a case where the bankruptcy debtor is the plain-
tiff in the case. The reason for this is definitional and arises
from the historic and statutory bankruptcy framework. Under
the statute, if a creditor files or prosecutes a claim against the
debtor, the claim is a core proceeding, even if it is a state law
claim." 9 The reason for this goes to the heart of our bank-
ruptcy system. The system is based on the assumption that an
orderly, centrally-controlled claims administration is best for
maximization of creditor payoffs. If creditors could litigate
their claims in state court, an inevitable race to the courthouse
would ensue,2 80 and federal administration would be meaning-
less. Thus, creditor claims are core proceedings. No one has
questioned the federal interest in having federal tribunals
decide creditor claims, nor has anyone questioned the federal
jurisdictional foundation for such cases. But if the creditor's
claim is created by state law and there is no diversity, the same
issues discussed herein must inevitably arise.
Moreover, if in a non-diversity creditor suit the debtor
asserts a state law counterclaim, the bankruptcy jurisdictional
statutes provide that the counterclaim is also a core proceed-
Professor Goldberg-Ambrose sees little or no problem with diversity jurisdiction vis-a-
vis state power and accountability. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 3, at 606-08.
Finally, Goldberg-Ambrose's hypothesis seems to be that federal courts will change
state law. However, the actual effect of systematic displacement of state courts
through protective jurisdiction is to freeze previous state law, which federal courts are
then required to follow. The problem is like the flip side of what would occur if
Congress removed a large branch of jurisdiction from the federal court. State judges
then would be faced with the option of ignoring Supreme Court precedents or, as the
sixth amendment counsels them, following those precedents, and thus freezing
existing federal law. See HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 363-64.
278. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 3, at 607.
279. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A).
280. See 11 U.S.C. § 362, which stays all such actions when a bankruptcy petition
is filed.
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ing.2"' Thus, without "related to" jurisdiction an anomalous
situation would arise. If a creditor asserted a claim, the federal
court would have jurisdiction; and, if the debtor asserted a
counterclaim against a creditor filing a claim, the federal court
would have jurisdiction of the counterclaim. But, absent pro-
tective jurisdiction, if the creditor did not assert a claim
because he chose not to, or did not have one (in which case he
would not be a creditor), the debtor could not sue the creditor
in federal court on a state law claim, absent diversity. This sit-
uation would be anomalous because timely collection and liqui-
dation of debtor claims can be just as advantageous to other
creditors as preventing the creditors' race to the courthouse.
Thus, the "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction rationally closes
the jurisdictional gap that might otherwise exist.
The question of personal injury cases related to bank-
ruptcy presents an interesting aside. As noted earlier, the stat-
ute literally requires these cases to be tried in the district
court, and the abstention provisions do not expressly apply to
them."2 Under that reading, even if timely adjudication of a
novel state tort question could occur in state court, the federal
court could not abstain. Perhaps Congress felt federal proce-
dures were preferable and that federal litigation would facili-
tate the bankruptcy court's ability to monitor pending
litigation and total claims against debtors. But neither con-
gressional concern with state court bias nor congressional pref-
erence for federal forums clearly appears. Under a "no
abstention" reading, whole areas of personal injury litigation
could conceivably be litigated in federal rather than state court
if a bankruptcy debtor or debtors were the only defendant(s)
in a certain class of cases. Given that potential risk and the
lack of clear congressional intent or purpose, the courts have
interpreted the statutes to allow discretionary abstention in
such cases.283
From this it can be seen that the political process has
served as an adequate check on protective jurisdiction in the
bankruptcy area. Protective jurisdiction over cases "related
to" bankruptcy is not an undue expansion of federal judicial
power at the states' expense for several reasons: concurrent
jurisdiction over "related to" bankruptcy, the abstention provi-
281. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
283. See supra note 43.
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sions, and the extent to which bankruptcy law already involves
federal adjudication of state law matters. Bankruptcy is a
prime example of Hart and Wechsler's statement that federal
law is interstitial in nature28 4 because it fills gaps left in the
backdrop of state law. Bankruptcy law relies heavily on state
law. The powers of the trustee (as well as the debtor in posses-
sion) to avoid certain transfers are derived from state law.28 -
State law also defines the "property rights" of the federal
bankruptcy estate.286 Many other bankruptcy issues, including
core matters, turn on issues of state property law, state secur-
ity interest laws, and state fraudulent conveyance law.28 7 With
federal judges and federal bankruptcy judges already deciding
all these frequently determinative issues of state law, it does
not seem an undue expansion of federal power to include some
state law "related to" cases between non-diverse parties when
to do so furthers vital national interests.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The "related to" bankruptcy jurisdiction over cases
between non-diverse parties in which state law governs the
decision of the case is constitutional under article III. This
jurisdiction is an example of "protective jurisdiction," which
Congress may create for any of several reasons. If Congress
acts pursuant to a valid article I power and the means it
chooses, a protective jurisdiction statute, are rationally related
to the ends, then a case within the grant of protective jurisdic-
tion "arises under a ... law of the United States"288 as article
III says it must. Supreme Court cases like Osborn, Lathrop,
284. HART & WECHSLER (2d ed.), supra note 3, at 470-71. See also In re Finley, 62
Bankr. 361, 368 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (federal court cannot abstain merely because
state law is involved as bankruptcy court must constantly apply state law to exercise
its specific jurisdiction over estate property); Countryman, The Uses of State Law in
Bankruptcy Cases (Part I), 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 407 (1972); Eisenberg, State Law in
Bankruptcy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953 (1980); Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66
HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1953).
285. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 544.
286. 11 U.S.C. § 541.
287. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 157. Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3), which provides that
the bankruptcy judge shall determine whether a matter is a core or non-core
proceeding, goes on to provide: "a determination that a matter is not a core proceeding
shall not be made solely on the basis that its resolution may be affected by State laws."
Thus Congress foresaw and warned that even core matters may be affected by and
involved with state, rather than federal, law.
288. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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Beeler, and Austrian support the constitutionality of the pro-
tective jurisdiction doctrine.
Many commentators have suggested limits on protective
jurisdiction that are mainly derived from the text of article III.
These limits unnecessarily hamper congressional power over
national interests. Although article III does serve as some
check on the limits of congressional action, the primary checks
are article I and, as in any case involving article I powers and
state sovereignty, the political process. In this vein, Wechsler's
articulation of the basis for protective jurisdiction and, more
particularly, the Wechsler variant are the most persuasive
statements of the theory of protective jurisdiction. They are
consistent with precedent, attractively simple, and minimize
judicial interference with legislative action.
Although there is some doubt that the political process is
ever an adequate check on congressional action, the "related
to" bankruptcy jurisdiction reveals that the political process
can and does work in the protective jurisdiction context. Con-
gress has protected state interests by providing for concurrent,
but not exclusive, jurisdiction and by providing for both
mandatory and discretionary abstention. In total, these meas-
ures protect the states' interest in interpreting and developing
their own law and at the same time further the federal interest
in an efficient bankruptcy system.
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